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STATE PROTECTION OF THE REPUTATION OF ITS
PRODUCTS
A FLORIDA law of 1927 prohibits the artificial maturation of citrus fruits by
the use of arsenical sprays and fertilizers." To that end, it makes the use of
such sprays and fertilizers on bearing citrus fruit trees a penal offense,2 and the
marketing of citrus fruit containing arsenic, unlawful.3 It provides for the
confiscation and destruction of the arsenated fruit. 4 Since all fruit contains
natural traces of arsenic, the law prescribes a test which reveals only the fact
of artificial treatment of the fruit by means of arsenates.5 Although the test,
1. FLA. ComOP. LAWS (1927) §§ 3239-3246, amended by Acts 1929, Ex. Sess., c. 14485.
2. FLA. Comm,. LAWS (1927) § 3239; Acts 1927, c. 11844, § 9.
3. Id. § 3240.
4. Id. § 3244.
5. Id. § 3242. The test is "an abnormal and excessively high ratio of total soluble
solids of the juice thereof [i.e. based on Laws 1925, c. 10103, now amended by Acts 1931,
c. 14662, FLA. CoMP. LAWS (Supp. 1934) § 3254(3)] indicating the presence of arsenic
therein." § 3243 provides for further chemical analysis after seizure; and § 3244 for con-
fiscation, if the chemical test confirms the original test indicating the presence of arsenic.
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and the provision for confiscation of fruit failing to meet the standards, are
obviously designed to supplement the prohibition of the use of arsenates,6 they
seem intended, as well, to impress the foreign consumer with the fact that
Florida law guarantees the consumer's health against the dangers of arsenic
residues in fruit.
Nevertheless, the larger purpose of the law is the resolution of an economic
conflict. Supplementary to Florida legislation prohibiting the marketing of
immature citrus fruit, the law is an antidote to one of the more widespread
species of evasion by which actually immature fruit has been artificially stimu-
lated to pass the maturity tests required by Florida law.7  Arsenic treatment
of bearing citrus fruit trees usually seems to produce an inferior fruit, outwardly
indistinguishable from companion produce on the market.8 At the same time,
it hastens the production of a chemical constituency of the fruit sufficient to
pass the maturity tests. The Florida grower who avails himself of the treat-
ment may advance the maturation of his fruit by some two months.9 He may
6. It is contended in opposition to the law that, literally applied, it would destroy the
citrus industry, since all fruit contains some trace of arsenic. Mayo v. Florida Grape-
fruit Growers' Protective Association, 151 So. 25, 42 (Fla. 1933). The argument disre-
gards the fact that the primary test provided, supra note 5, has been shown conclusively
to indicate only that the fruit has been treated with arsenic sprays and fertilizers. Annual
Report, Florida State Chemist, Results Obtained with Arsenical Spray Experiments During
1033 (Fla. Dep't of Agric. 1934) 43 FLA. Q. BULL. No. 1, pp. 29-54; Enforcement of
Arsenical Spray Law, 1931-1932 (Fla. Dep't of Agric. 1933) 42 FLA. Q. BuLL. No. 2; Nelson &
Mottern (Bur. of Chem., U. S. Dep't of Agric.) Effect of Lead Arsenate Spray on the Com-
position and Vitamin Content of Oranges (1932) 22 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 587. It would
seem that if the legislature of Florida had intended to strike at natural, as well as artificial
arsenation, it would have prescribed the Gutzeit test, or a similar one, for determination
by the citrus inspector of the presence of arsenic in the fruit. See Enforcement of Arsenical
Spray Law, supra, at 34-42.
7. The arsenic treatment seems to result in a heavy decrease in percentage of anhydrous
citric acid in the fruit while leaving the percentage of total sugars in the juice practically
unchanged and reducing slightly the total solids in the juice. Instead of effecting a true
maturation by increase of sugars, as well as decrease of citric acid, its principal effect
seems to be an abnormal decrease in the latter. Nevertheless, the treatment results in a
sufficient spread of percentage between total soluble solids of the juice and anhydrous
citric acid to pass the maturity tests, supra note 5. Annual Report, Florida State Chemist,
supra note 6. For a scientific discussion of the effect of the sprays, see Reduced Acidity
in Oranges Caused by Certain Sprays (1921) CAL. DE"T oF AGRIc. MoNTHLY BULL., Vol.
X, No. 1, pp. 11-35.
Previous to the enactment of the 1925 maturity law, a favorite evasion, along with the
arsenic treatment, seems to have been to heat-process the fruit in order to produce ripe
color. Kilgore v. Mayo, 54 F. (2d) 143 (S. D. Fla. 1931). The Florida Supreme
Court had ruled, in Moran v. Le Jeune, 78 Fla. 643, 83 So. 668 (1919), that, under the 1913
immaturity law (Fla. Acts 1913, c. 6515, § 1) fruit passing the color test would not have
to pass the citric acid test.
8. MaTxcy v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 566, 567, 139 So. 121, 127, 128 (1932).
9. Florida Grapefruit Growers' Protective Association v. Mayo, Lakeland Evening
Ledger and Star-Telegram, Aug. 17, 1933, at 3 (opinion of Circ. Ct. of 10th Judicial Circ.
of Fla., granting injunction).
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thus secure the higher prices of the early-season market for what is actually an
artificially matured mid-season or late-season variety. Consequently, he is
enabled to compete effectively in the early season market with more favorably
situated domestic and foreign growers.'0 On the other hand, the greater part
of the citrus-growing area of Florida seems geographically and climatically
situated to put out high-grade early season fruit without the aid of the artificial
maturation process. The majority contend that the early season flood of
inferior arsenated fruit is a menace to the reputation and value of Florida
fruit of both early and late season variety." They contend, furthermore, that
arsenically-treated citrus fruit is a fraud on the consumer, that it enables an infe-
rior and injurious product to pass for the normal grade, that it makes possible the
shipping of actually green fruit by the mixture of such fruit with the artificially-
treated fruit at the time of inspection. 2  Thus, behind the veil of consumer
protection, a three-cornered economic conflict is in progress: minority versus
majority of the domestic industry; minority versus foreign competition; and,
to a lesser degree, majority versus foreign competition. In the case of the
Florida grapefruit growers, at least, the contention of a large section of that
branch of the citrus industry is that the rising tide of Texas competition cannot
be met without the use of the artificial maturation process. Allegedly, the
industry is otherwise doomed.'3
If the consumer is afforded protection by the arsenical spray law, the pro-
tection is largely theoretical. Beset by attacking Florida grower interests, the
history of the law has been from its inception primarily one of unenforcement.
Although it has twice successfully run the gamut of constitutional objection,
once in the lower federal court 14 and once in the Florida Supreme Court,1r
the teeth of the law have been extracted in the process of application to
violators.' 6 A dictum of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1931, to
10. Ibid.
11. Brief for the Commissioner of Agriculture, appellant, in Mayo v. Florida Grape-
fruit Growers' Protective Association, supra note 6. Note the reasons given for passage
of the law in affidavit of Hon. John S. Taylor, President of the Florida Senate at the time
the law was passed. Mayo case, supra note 6, at 40-41.
12. Mr. J. J. Taylor, Florida State Chemist, points out that "The damage to market
is not so much from the arsenated fruit itself as from the green fruit that is mixed
with it!' By mixing a few boxes of arsenated fruit, in which there is an abnormally large
spread between percentages of solids of the juice and acid, with a large quantity of green
fruit, in which the spread may be very small, the average of percentage of solids to acid
in the total quantity of fruit will be sufficiently large to enable all the fruit to pass
inspection. Enforcement of Arsenical Spray Law, supra note 6, at 3.
13. Opinion of Judge Pettaway, supra note 9.
14. Kilgore v. Mayo, 54 F. (2d) 143 (S. D. Fla. 1931).
15. Maxcy v. Mayo, supra note 8.
16. Enforcement of Arsenical Spray Law, supra note 5, at 3, 4, 8-10. For example,
during 1929-30, the period of the Mediterranean fruit-fly quarantine, many growers con-
tended that the use of arsenated sprays and fertilizers was essential in fighting the fruit-fly
menace. Fruit grown in quarantined areas was expressly excepted from the operation
of the arsenical spray law. Fla. Acts 1929, c. 14485. As a result, Florida fruit received
[Val. 43
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the effect that the reopening of issues of constitutionality may not be precluded
by the dogma of stare decisis 17 has afforded an "Open Sesame" in 1933 to recon-
sideration by the Florida Supreme Court of the constitutionality of the arsenical
spray law. Two suits to enjoin its enforcement as to grapefruit once more raise
the issue.' 8 Because of the characteristic intermingling of grapefruit and other
citrus fruit trees in the groves, invalidation of the act as to grapefruit would
seem seriously to jeopardize the effectiveness of the act as to other citrus fruits.
Two appeals having reached the Florida Supreme Court in October, 1933, one
from a decree granting, the other from a later decree of another lower court
denying a temporary injunction, the court split evenly in opinion. The decree
of temporary injunction was therefore affirmed, but with express reservation of
the constitutional question for consideration upon appeal from a decree of
permanent injunction.19 To half of the Florida court, the exercise of police
power, held valid in January, 1932, had, by October, 1933, become, at least as
to production of grapefruit, "arbitrary and confiscatory . . . by reason of later
events." 20 To the other half, the justification of the law has not been shaken
by any "better understanding"21 of, or "material change" in, the conditions to
which the law applies. The final test of the constitutionality of the law seems
due shortly 22
Analysis of the issues before the Florida Supreme Court would not lead to
the conclusion that the foreign consumer has the primary legal interest in
being protected against arsenic doses in his breakfast delicacy, or against
fraudulent deception in purchasing citrus fruits. That continued spraying of
considerable unfavorable publicity in other states. Brief for Commissioner of Agriculture,
appellant, in Mayo v. Florida Grapefruit Growers' Protective Association, supra note 6,
at 93.
17. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931).
13. Mayo v. Florida Grapefruit Growers' Protective Association, supra note 6; Bishpam
v. Mayo, 151 So. 45 (1933).
19. A similar unusual procedure was followed in Burnett v. Greene, 97 Fla. 1007, 122
So. 570 (1929). The Florida Supreme Court consists of six judges, sitting either in a body or
in two divisions of three judges each. Concurrence of a majority is necessary to a decision.
Failing such a majority in the case of appeal from an interlocutory decree involving the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature, the court may affirm, reserving the question
of constitutionality for decision on final appeal.
20. Note 17, supra. That half of the court also contends that the question is not res
adjudicata, on the ground that the previous decision in Maxcy v. Mayo, supra note 8,
involved only oranges. The contention seems hardly justified in view of the sweeping
vindication of the act in that decision. For a satirical comment on the problem, see
New Yorker, April 7, 1934, at 17.
21. Interestingly, the opinion of Davis, C. J., in Mayo v. Florida Grapefruit Growers'
Protective Ass'n, supra note 6, at 27 points out: "While it cannot be denied that the
record now brought before the court does show that much more is to-day known concern-
ing the policy and wisdom of such a statute as applied to grapefruit . . ., such better
understanding is not a 'changed condition' such as was referred to in the Abie State Bank
Case ..."
22. Information received in communication from office of the Florida Attorney-General
to the YALE LAW jOURNAL.
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bearing citrus fruit trees with arsenates may become a source of positive injury
to the consumer is a possible deduction from the evidence.23  That the treat-
ment robs the fruit of valuable constituent qualities, particularly of its Vitamin
C content, is clear 2 4 Yet, a candid appraisal would indicate that the State
must find a broader basis than mere protection of the foreign consumer's health
or pocketbook, to justify the exercise of police power.2 5 Under prevailing no-
tions a State's exercise of police power is justified only by considerations of the
resultant benefits to its own citizens. That may not satisfy the more exalted
tenets of morality, in particular, the admonition to "Love thy neighbor." It
does, however, satisfy the different logic of the law which defines police power
against the conceptual background of jurisdiction and sovereignty. Thus, al-
though the protection of its own consumers,' if that were at issue, would justify
Florida's enactment of the arsenical spray law,2 6 strictly legal considerations
would not seem to justify its protection of foreign consumers at the expense of
the economic interests of a portion of its own citizenry. The manner in which
23. Latest tests indicate that particularly on grapefruit (i.e. "It takes about four times
as much arsenic on grapefruit as on oranges to get the desired result.' See Enforcement
of Arsenical Spray Law, supra note 6, at 18), use of the arsenates in a solution sufficiently
strong to get effective results, in the form of citric acid reduction, leaves abnormal traces
of arsenic in rag and juice, as well as rind. Annual Report, Florida State Chemist, supra
note 6, at 29-54. It may be noted that the rind, in which the most perceptible traces
seem to be left, is to a limited extent turned into saleable products (i.e. candies and pre-
serves), just as rag and juice. It is also noteworthy that tests show continued annual
spraying to be necessary in order to get effective results. The Florida Chief Laboratory
Inspector reports that whereas initial spraying seems to leave the more perceptible traces
in the rind, with little in rag and juice, continued spraying over a period of years seems
to have an opposite effect. Enforcement of Arsenical Spray Law, supra note 6.
The opposition to the law contends that it is unreasonable in absolutely prohibiting
the arsenic treatment, because reasonable use thereof is not harmful. A communication
to the YALE LAw JousxAL from the Principal Horticulturist, U. S. Bureau of Plant
Industry, Dep't of Agric., tends to show that very careful use of the arsenic treatment is
not harmful, either to fruit or consumer. The contention was fully answered in the 1932
decision in Maxcy v. Mayo, supra note 8, on the basis of "a reasonable margin of enforce-
ment." Furthermore, the evidence more than supports a reasonable doubt.
24. The arsenated product is usually inferior in taste and quality, both for immediate
consumption and canning purposes. Maxcy v. Mayo, supra note 8; The Citrus Industry,
April, 1927, June, 1933. The process abstracts from the fruit most of its valuable (anti-
scorbutic) Vitamin C content. Nelson and Mottern, supra note 6. Florida grapefruit
and other citrus fruit, as well as those of Texas and California, are widely advertised for
their Vitamin C content. See Florida Fruits and Vegetables in the Family Menu (1932)
FLA. DEP'T AoRic. BuLr.. No. 46, 22-23, 27, 29, 86-87; How Advertising Helps to Spread
Scientific Ideas Among the Masses (Sept. 1931), CoxsuMrs' RrsF.cH, INc., GEiN. Buu..;
see also typical advertisement in New Yorker, March 24, 1934, 58, 59.
25. See, for example, state's answer to bill of complaint in the Mayo case, supra note
6, at 32.
26. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio,
183 U. S. 238 (1902); Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510 (1916); Hebe Co. v.
Shaw, 248 U. S. 297 (1919); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U. S. 427 (1919).
The above cases uphold state legislation protecting the consumer against fraudulent dis-
[Vol. 43
the United States Supreme Court justified the first Florida immaturity law in
1915 affords a striking illustration. Appellant argued that protection of the
health of foreign consumers was not a legitimate objective of the exercise of
police power. Mr. Justice Day, proposing at the outset of his opinion to prove
that the objection was unsound, effectively avoided it by arguing that the exercise
of power was justified by the purpose of protecting the reputation, and thereby
the value, of the State's domestic product 27 Furthermore, if the main purpose
of the arsenical spray law were to guarantee the foreign consumer's health, it
might well be asked by the opposition to the law, why similar legislation has
not been effected with respect to spraying of Florida tomatoes, strawberries
and vegetables with arsenates.2 s In view of the fact that arsenic is sprayed
directly on edible portions of the latter commodities, the danger to health
would seem to be even more evident. Clearly, the central issue is not whether
artificial maturation of the grapefruit, as the immediate subject of the injunc-
tion, will tend to deceive the foreign consumer, or to injure his health. It is,
rather, whether the deception or injury is so marked as likely to leave a con-
sumer reaction against the Florida product in its wake. In fact, since the
essential constitutional issue involved is whether the arsenical spray law pro-
tects a sufficiently important economic interest of the state,29 a widespread
consumer belief in the ill-effects of the arsenic treatment, whether based on
fact or not, would justify the exercise of power.30 The threatened economic
loss through a consumer reaction is no less compelling because the consumer
may be in error.
Against the question of consumer reaction is balanced that of whether the
alleged interest of an important group of Florida grapefruit growers in meeting
the threat of Texas competition on the early season market 3 ' justifies the
simulation in foods irrespective of whether the article be actually harmful to health.
27. Sigh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 58 (1915).
23. See opinion of Brown, J., concurring specially with Ellis and Bufford, J. J., in
opposition to the law, in the Mayo case, supra note 6, at 39.
29. For parallel situations see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928); Kelleher v.
French, 22 F. (2d) 341 (W. D. Va. 1921), aff'd, 278 U. S. 563; Kelleher v. Schoene,
14 F. (2d) 341 (W. D. Va. 1926); Upton v. Felton, 4 F. Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1932);
Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 105 S. E. 141 (1920); Lemon v.
Rumsey, 103 W. Va. 242, 150 S. E. 725 (1929).
30. That such a widespread consumer belief is existent, is indicated by the following:
KALILr AND ScHmIzyx, 100,000,000 GuiNEA PIGs (1933) 4, 9, 47-61, 229, 230, 297; CoN-
surmmRS' RE EARcH, INc., GEN. BuLus. (July, 1933), and (Jan., 1934); Significance and
Danger of Spray Residue (1933) 25 J. or InD. & ENG. CHxm. 624; Kallet and Schlink,
Eat and be Poisoned (1932) 135 NATION 325; Cou-nay GE=TLE , March, 1933; Myers,
Throne and Van Dyck, Arsenic as a Problem in Present Day Public Health Management
(1929) LVfl Mmi. Tnm 134; Myers and Throne, Health Hazards from the Ingestion of
Sinwll Amounts of Metals (Oct. 15, 1929) N. Y. STATE JouR. or Mm.; Relation of Arsenic
to Public Health (July 15, 1929) N. Y. STATE JouR. or MED.; (April, 1926) AM. J. Pus.
HEALTr, 403 (poisoning by arsenical sprays); Dangers of Industrial Preparations of
Arsenic (1922) 2 BUR. MMn. J. 113, 371.
31. It is doubtful whether the argument made by the opposition to the law in this
respect is well founded. That there has been a heavy increase, since 1927, in outside
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alleged risk of the consumer reaction against the entire Florida citrus fruit
industry. The Legislature of Florida would seem best qualified conclusively to
answer both questions. It did so in 1927 by passing the law. It did so again,
in 1933, in answer to claims of "changed conditions" making the arsenical spray
law "unreasonable," by refusing to pass bills designed to withdraw the grape-
fruit industry from the scope of the law.3 2  It has therefore conclusively regis-
tered its belief that the law is still economically justified. Nevertheless, three
judges of the six-judge Florida Supreme Court disagreed with that conclusion
in the opinion rendered but several months after the above bills were de-
feated 3 3  For the judiciary to determine that conditions have changed suffi-
ciently to invalidate a formerly valid police measure, in the face of an almost
contemporaneous legislative determination to the contrary, seems to be an
extreme extension of judicial review and of the United States Supreme Court
dictum in Abie State Bank v. Weaver.3 4
The arsenical spray law, and the real objectives behind it, are not without
honorable lineage. For the Florida Supreme Court to validate the law would,
therefore, by no means demand a departure from established legal doctrine.
Protection of the reputation of the market-town and the guild amongst con-
sumers "in foreign parts" by legal process against the domestic "chiseler" was
familiar to the common law3 5 Colonial and state legislation, providing for the
inspection, grading, certification, and prohibition of movement of domestic
commodities destined for interstate and foreign commerce, has been a frequent
subject in statute-book and decision.3 6 Generally, such legislation has been
competition in the grapefruit industry seems clear. Citrus Growing in Florida (Fla. Dep't
of Agric. 1931) BuLL. No. 2; U. S. DEP'T or Acaic., YEARBoox or AOaicuxLro E (1933) 524.
Principal early-season competition seems to come from Texas. Nevertheless, no materially
"changed condition" in character of competition since the Maxcy case, supra note 8, seems
to have occurred. Florida growers of the seeded early-season variety of grapefruit, naturally
matured, seem to have continued their dominant position on the early-season market.
CmcAO Faurr & VEGErABLE REPORTEm, issues from September to December, 1932
and 1933.
According to information received in communications to the YALE LAW JomUAL from
the Chief of the Texas Division of Plant Quarantine (March, 1934), and from the Chief
of the Division of Chemistry, California Dep't of Agriculture (March, 1934), the allega-
tion that Texas and California growers are resorting on a large scale to arsenic treatment
to beat Florida growers to the market seems weak.
32. FLA. SEN. Bnz.s 434, 435 and 436, and House BU.L 1252 (1933).
33. Mayo v. Florida Grapefruit Growers' Protective Association, supra note 6.
34. Note 17, supra.
35. Hamilton, Caveat Emptor (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133, 1149.
36. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) acts 2805c, 2808a, 2809, 2810, 2810a; Coxo. CollP.
LAWs (Courtright, 1932 Supp.) §§ 3029.1-3029.41; CONN. GEm. STATS. (1930) §§ 2060-2074;
DEL. REV. STATs. (1915) § 668, Del. Laws 1929, c. 96; Fla. Acts 1911, c. 6236, §§ 1-3,
Acts 1913, c. 6515, §§ 1-4, Acts 1925, c. 10103, §§ 1-14; Acts 1927, c. 11875, §§ 1-4, Acts
1927, c. 11844, §§ 1-9, Acts 1929, c. 13584, §§ 1-16, Acts 1931, c. 14662, §§ 1-24; FLA.
ComT. LAws (1927) §9 7030-7043 (as to naval stores); IDAHO CODE ANT. (1932) §§ 22-SOI
to 22-916; ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 5, §§ 92-103; ME. REv. STAT. (1930)
c. 41, §§ 40-55; Md. Laws 1933, c. 404; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1933) c. 94,
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validated both by state and federal courts 3 7 The federal government has
enacted similar legislation to protect the reputation of American products on
foreign markets.38 A recent federal experience with the subject, comparable to
the Florida legislation at hand, has been the setting of a minimum tolerance
for arsenic spray residue on American apples intended for export.39 State
legislation, closely analogous to the arsenical spray law, and concerned with
the prohibition of the shipment and sale of immature fruit, is a comparatively
recent development.40 Federal legislation has practically ignored the imma-
3§ 100-117F; McH. Com. LAWS (1929) §§ 5546, 5559, 5570-5614; NEv. Coxn'. LAWs
(Hillyer, 1929) §§ 8320-8334; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 165, §§ 1-17; N. Y. AGRICULTURE
AND MARKETS LAW (Cahill, 1930) c. 1, §§ 157-160, 160H-160K, and see Laws of N. Y.
(1933) c. 235; N. C. CODE Aim. (Michie, 1931) §§ 4781-4793; Omo GEN. CODE (Page,
Supp. 1934) §§ 13128-1 to 13128-11; ORE. CODE AIM. (1930) §§ 18-2901 to 18-2912;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 3, §§ 21-33; S. C. CIV. CODE (Michie, 1932) §§ 6662-72;
S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) §§ 7992-8007; Laws of Utah (1925) c. 27 (1929) c. 5, § 172,
cl. 5; VT. PUB. LAWS (1933) §§ 7799-7820, 7693-7704; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930)
§§ 14S5(32)-1485(37), 1454(1) to 1454(7); WAsr. REv. STAT. ANN. (Rem. 1933) §§ 2854-55;
W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 19, art. 5, §§ 1-8; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 99.10; WYO. REV. STAT. ANN.
(1931) H§ 5-801 to 5-806. Texas laws in this field are fully summarized in 24 TEXAs
JumumSU EE (McKinney, 1933) tit. INSPECTION § 2. In a communication of April 10,
1934 from the California Department of Agriculture to the YALE LAW JOURNAL, it is noted
that CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) act 2806, passed in 1919, limiting the use of arsenates
in sulphuring fruit to protect against spray residues, is not being enforced. But Cal. Agri-
cultural Code (1933) prohibits marketing of agricultural products "carrying spray resi-
dues or other added deleterious ingredients in excess of the quantity prescribed by the laws
of the United States." For a summary of early American legislation on the subject, see
Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, 51-54 (1882).
37. Turner v. Maryland, supra note 36; Slight v. Kirkwood, supra note 27; Maxcy v.
Mayo, supra note 8; Kilgore v. Mayo, supra note 14; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 65 Fla. 123, 61
So. 185 (1913); Ex parte Fujii, 189 Cal. 55, 207 Pac. 537 (1922); Ex parte Peppers, 189
Cal. 682, 209 Pac. 896 (1922) Ex parte Mefferd, 299 Pac. 58 (Cal. 1931) ; Ex parte Hayes,
25 P. (2d) 230 (Cal. 1933). Contra: Ex parte Hayden, 147 Cal. 649, 82 Pac. 315 (1905);
State v. Peet, 80 Vt. 449, 68 Atl. 661 (1908) (state meat inspection law held in conflict with
federal regulation in same field) ; Mattei v. Hecke, 99 Cal. App. 723, 279 Pac. 470 (1929) ;
People v. Stanley, 90 Colo. 315, 9 P. (2d) 288 (1932); Inman v. Sandvig, 170 Wash. 112, 15
P. (2d) 696 (1932). All of the latter opinions admit the valid basis for such exercise of the
police power, but deny the "reasonableness" of the means adopted.
38'. 39 STAT. 476, 481 (1916), 26 U. S. C. § 740 (1926), Cotton Futures Act; 39 STAT.
482 (1916), 7 U. S. C. §§ 71, 76 (1926), Grain Standards Act; 48 STAT. 124 (1933), 7
U. S. C. Supp. VII H§ 581-589 (1933), Export Standards for Apples and Pears.
39. The immediate spur to federal action was the threat of England, in particular, to
prohibit importation of American apples, as a result of numerous poisonings from spray
residues. KALLEr & Scimx, op. cit. supra note 30, at 50; Myers, Throne and Van Dyck,
supra note 30. A similar problem is arising in the case of export of American sulphured
fruits. KALLET AND ScnLIn, op. cit. supra.
40. Florida seems to have been first in the field. Supra note 36. As to citrus fruit,
scee also CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) act 2805c, § 18; Tex. Gen. Laws 1931, c. 244.
Citrus inspection periods of Florida and Texas are practically identical. Florida law seeking
by progressively more strict enactment (supra note 36) since 1911 to control the subject of
1934]
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turity problem, leaving it open to state regulation.41
Generally, the raison d'etre of such legislation is to be explained in terms of
a conflict of minority versus majority producer interests, rather than of con-
sumer protection. That the consumer's interest would receive secondary con-
sideration in the conflict, would seem not unnatural. This is particularly true
as to state legislation, where the foreign consumer's interest is necessarily sub-
ordinated to considerations of economic competition. Uniform federal control
offers the only practicable possibility of equilibrating considerations of economic
competition with those of consumer welfare. The consumer has the most vital
interest at stake in preventing an inferior and dangerous product from reaching
the market. Federal control, alone, can afford that interest the primary con-
sideration it merits. Yet, in the case of the arsenic problem, at least, the more
effective measures of control are left to the state, there to hinge on the shifting
balance between the state's fear of outside competition and its fear of consumer
revolt. Thus, the test set in the Florida arsenical spray law to reveal the use
of prohibited arsenates would in effect set the legal tolerance for arsenic, present
in and on fruit, far lower than the "occasionally enforced" federal tolerance.
42
Again, in contrast with foreign countries, federal control in this field seems
seriously deficient. Anomalously, the United States Pure Food and Drug
Administration has compelled American fruit exporters to observe the lower
arsenic tolerances deemed by foreign governments to constitute a minimum of
safety for their Utizens, while allowing the higher tolerance for domestic con-
sumption. 43 Furthermore, the mere setting of a tolerance by the administra-
tion is not in itself a guarantee of protection, since there is necessitated in each
instance proof to the satisfaction of a jury that the particular libelled shipment
contains enough poison to be "harmful to health."44 Yet, competent investiga-
tion has shown that repeated doses in food of even the most minute quantities
of the poison subject the purchaser to the danger of obscure maladies.4 5
immaturity as to citrus fruit, has been upheld in state and federal decisions. Sligh v. Kirk-
wood, supra notes 27 and 37; Kilgore v. Mayo, supra note 14; Johnson v. State ex. rel.
Maxcy, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853 (1930); Maxcy v. Mayo, supra note S.
41. But see complaint in Federal Inspection Decisions, 133 (March 28, 1911), and
48 STAT. 123 (1933), 7 U. S. C. Supp. VII §§ 581-589 (1933), Export Standards for Apples.
and Pears.
42. For critical analysis, see KAY,,LET AN ScHIIrx, op. cit. supra note 30; Kallet and
Schlink, supra note 30; CoNsurams' RESFARCH, INC., GEN. BULL., supra note 30. But
cf. REP. SEC. AcRic. (Nov. 15, 1933) 970-8; REP. CnIr oF Foon AND DRUG ADn.;. (Aug.
31, 1933).
43. KALLET AND ScmLxuIx, op. cit. supra note 30; Kallet and Schlink, supra note 30.
44. REP. C aa oF Foon AND DRUG. Ammn., supra note 42; Congress Considers a New
lPood and Drugs Bill (1934) 13 CONG. DIG. 65; How Much Poison is Poison? (U. S. Dep't
of Agric., Aug. 28, 1933) FooD AND DRUG ADISMISTRATION BULL. No. 4. For cases in point,
involving a similar arsenic problem under the Federal Pure Food and Drugs Law, see
Weeks v. United States, 224 Fed. 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); W. B. Wood Manufacturing Co.
v. United States, 286 Fed. 84 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
45. KALLET AND Scasnx, op. cit. supra note 30; Kallet and Schlink, supra note 30;
ROSENAU, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND HYGIENE (1927); Myers, Throne and Van Dyck,
supra note 30.
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Repeatedly, the use of arsenic and similar deadly poisons in fruit and vegetable
sprays, in any degree, has been decried by medical specialists and chemists. 4
This is to an extent recognized in the proposed revision of the Pure Food and
Drug Law, now pending, which would give the Secretary of Agriculture power
to set maximum tolerances having the force of law, for "necessary" poisons in
foods.47  The criterion, proposed in the Bill, for the setting of minimum toler-
ances is not alone the danger of the poison in the particular shipments, but the
danger of the cumulative effect from minute doses, harmless in a single in-
stance.48  Although the need for revision of the existing law is not disputed,
it would seem that federal officials have failed to make the most effective use
of existing tools for control. It would seem that an artificial maturation process
which is known to "abstract valuable constituents of the article" could be
reached by Section 7 of the present law, however impossible it may be to show
in a particular shipment, to a jury's satisfaction, a quantity of arsenic "harmful
to health."
49
The Citrus Marketing Agreement and License, ° adopted pursuant to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act,01 offers new possibilities of a federal check on
arsenic treatment of citrus fruit. Federal inspection of all citrus fruit shipped
in interstate commerce is, by virtue of the A.A.A. license, for the first time
made mandatory upon all shippers. At present, the inspection is limited to
the purpose of sizing and grading, grading being determined solely by the
appearance of the peel. No reason appears, however, why the inspection could
not be extended to the contents of the fruit to detect arsenic residues or con-
cealed inferiority due to artificial maturation by arsenic, thus preventing an
unfair method of production by preventing shipment of the product of that
method. Moreover, regulation of shipments of the fruit may incidentally
tend to remove the economic incentive from the use of the artificial maturation
process by halting the race between shippers to obtain the higher price returns
of the early-season market. The possibility of removing the incentive to
ship artificially matured late or mid-season fruit in the early season is illustrated
by the recent order of the Florida Citrus Control Committee, setting a late-
season date before which Marsh Seedless grapefruit, a late-season variety, may
not be shipped.52  The proration of citrus fruit shipment on a national scale,
as contemplated by the three citrus marketing agreements, may result in the
material reduction of interstate competition. The consequent stabilization of
46. Id.; see also note 30, supra.
47. §§ 3(a) and 10(a) of the Bill, as reported back from Committee, 78 CoNG. RFc.
9222 (1934).
43. Id. § 10(a).
49. 34 STAT. 763 (1906), 21 U. S. C. § 8 (1926).
50. Marketing Agreement No. 29, License No. 22, Florida Citrus Fruit Area (Dec. 14,
1933); see also Agreement No. 30, License No. 23, for southwestern area; and Agreement
No. 33, License No. 26, for Texas area.
Some degree of possible protection would seem to be afforded by the Perishable Agri-
cultural Commodities Act, 46 STAT. 531 (1930), 7 U. S. C. Surp. VII §§ 551, 564 (1933).
51. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. Supp. VII § 601 (1933).
52. The Control Committee acted under the AAA. agreement for the Florida area. The
midseason varieties have not as yet been affected.
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shipment should afford a new answer to the argument that artificial maturation
of grapefruit is necessary in defense against the threat of a disproportionate
increase in foreign production.5 3  The contemplated allotment by the Florida
Citrus Control Committee of permissible shipment by each grower 4 should
tend to remove the incentive to arsenic treatment, resulting from the fact that
maturity periods of the several Florida citrus-growing districts differ. If each
grower is allotted a certain amount of fruit which he may ship during the
season, and if, by virtue of the comprehensive proration scheme, he is assured
a fairly stable market throughout the season, arsenic treatment could hardly be
said to be any longer an economic necessity.
The arsenical spray law problem is but one evidence of the inadequacies of
legislative protection of the consumer. Generally, as in the Florida case, the
legislation is dictated by producer interests. The consumer is the indirect
recipient of legislative favor. Even the Federal Pure Food and Drug Law,
allegedly, has in its enforcement subordinated the consumer interest to that
of the producer. 5 Fortunately, however, consumer awareness of self-interest
seems to be growing apace. The proposed Tugwell Bill to revise the Pure
Food and Drug Law, emasculated though that Bill has been by the pressure of
producer groups, 6 is some indication of a widespread and increasing opinion
among consumers, demanding more adequate protection.
7
53. In any case, accepting the economic premises of the Florida legislation, the way
to meet Texas competition would hardly seem to lie in adding an effective sales argument
against Florida fruit.
54. Marketing Agreement for Florida area, supra note 51, at art. IV, § 3.
55. KALLET A&ND ScHmniN, op. cit. supra note 30; Kallet and Schlink, supra note 30;
Government Bureaus for Private Profit, NATiON (Nov. 11, 1931) ; Protection of the Consumer
of Food and Drugs (1933) Vol. 1, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLaS, No. 1; CONSuMM.S'
REsEARcH, Isc., GEN. BuLL. (April, 1933) 1, (July, 1933) 6, (Oct., 1933) 10. In general,
see Congress Considers a New Food and Drugs Bill, supa note 44; Legis. (1932) 32 CoL.
L. REv. 720.
56. Compare the original S. B. 1944 [77 CONG. REc. 5721 (1933)) with the bill, as
favorably reported back from Committee, supra note 47. Section 3, striking at poisons
in foods, whether "added" or not, and providing for the setting of limits of tolerance, was
reported back with the following exception attached in Committee: "(e) Nothing in this
act shall be construed to prohibit the enhancement of the color of mature and wholesome
citrus fruit to the varietal color therefor, by means harmless to the consumer of such
fruits, nor to require any declaration of such enhancement, by labelling or otherwise."
See attack on that exception in Further Adventures of Pure Food Bill (1934) 51 CmusmIaX
CENT. 413. The exception noted refers principally to the ethylene or carbon monoxide
treatment of citrus fruit to produce ripe color artificially. The Florida product being
somewhat inferior in natural appearance to that of California, the above treatment is in
even more widespread vogue in Florida packing houses than in California and elsewhere.
It has been suggested that the possibly injurious effect of this treatment on the fruit has
never been investigated from the consumer standpoint. Artificial Ripening (July-Dec. 1927)
Vol. 66, ScicE, Supp. XII; in general, see Chemically Ripened Fruit (Oct. 29, 1927)
95 LiT. DiG. 24.
Section 11 of the proposed bill, after providing for the setting by the Secretary of
Agriculture of "a definition and standard of identity, and a reasonable standard of quality
.. " for any food, has been modified in Committee as follows: "Provided, That no stand-
ard of quality shall be established for fresh fruits and vegetables."
57. But cf. (May, 1934) 8 Tre or ADvTsG. AND MExmG. 10, 11 ("Dog Days").
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A SURVEY OF SECTIONS 74 AND 75 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT IN ACTUAL OPERATION
WHEN Congress added Sections 74 and 751 to the National Bankruptcy Act 2
early in 1933, it did so under a barrage of criticism. The ostensible purpose
of these provisions-to provide relief for distressed debtors whose affairs do
not warrant or require liquidation-is purported to be accomplished by provid-
ing for composition or extension agreements when demanded by a debtor and
agreed to by half in number and amount of his creditors.3 On the floor of the
House is was asserted that this legislation was a menace to the national credit
structure4 and would afford no relief to the harrassed debtors for whose benefit
it was intended.5 In the Senate the comments on Section 75, which deals
solely with compositions and extensions for agricultural debtors, were vitriolic.6
While in part these comments may be discounted as being political manoeuvers
made for the benefit of inquisitive constituents, similar criticisms have else-
where persisted after the passage of the Act. More specifically it has been
claimed that the provisions are ambiguous, 7 that they are unworkable,8 destruc-
tive of creditors' rights9 and give secured creditors undue power to dictate the
terms of any agreement to be negotiated.' 0 Further it is objected that they
are repetitious of Sections 12 and 131 except in that they provide for no
discharge,' 2 an omission which is further regarded as objectionable. These criti-
1. Added by P. L. No. 420, 72d Cong. 2d Sess. (1933) (H. R. 14359). Originally
embodied in S. 3866, introduced in the Senate Feb. 29, 1932, and an identical bill H. R.
9968, introduced in the House March 1, 1932.
2. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
3. For an analysis of the provisions of this section see Garrison, The Recent Amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 330; Weinstein, Chapter VIII of the
Bankruptcy Act (1933) 38 Com. L. J. 171; Hunt, An Analysis of the New Amendments
to the Federal Bankruptcy Act, id. at 190; Hunt, Provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy
Act Relating to Agricultural Compositions, id. at 234; Hanna, Recent Additions to
the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 1 GEO. WAsH L. REv. 448; Hanna, Bankruptcy Amendments
of 1933 (1933) 2 M cERcER BEAsL Y L. Rav. 113; Garrison, The New Bankruptcy Amend-
ments: Some Problems of Construction (1933) 8 Wis. L. REV. 289; Note (1933) 21 GEO.
L. REv. 483.
4. See remarks of Representative Chindlom (Illinois), 75 CONG. REC. 2929 (1933).
5. See remarks of Representative Patman (Texas), 75 CoNG. RFC. 2929 (1933).
6. See remarks of Senator Blaine branding Section 75 as "a perpetration of a joke on
the farmer," "a futile gesture," and "another bone." 75 CONG. RFc. 4910-4911 (1933).
7. See Weinstein; Hunt, An Analysis of the New Amendments to the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act; Hanna, Bankruptcy Amendments of 1933, all supra note 3.
8. See Weinstein, Section 74: Compositions and Extensions (1933) 7 JouRNAr NAT'L
Assoc. Rrx=Fs nm BAxarc-= 140, 145; King, Experimenting with our Bankruptcy Act,
id. at 93, 100.
9. See note 8, supra.
10. See Richter, Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 8 NoTmE DAMI
LAW 460, 482, 490; Note (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 704.
11. See Richter, supra note 10, at 482; Note (1933) 28 IL. L. Rv. 398.
12. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 145. But compare comments favorable to this see-
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cisms are frequently the result of careful consideration, but they are made with-
out the benefit of any experience with these particular sections. To determine,
if possible, the validity of these theoretical objections, a study of the first
year's operation of these provisions has been made by means of a circular
questionnaire sent to all referees in bankruptcy in the United States. The
referees were asked to report the number, kind and disposition of cases brought
under these sections as well as their personal reactions to the practical operation
of them.
Of the 510 referees circularized, answers were received from 340; and of
those making returns, 212 had had no experience with cases under either
section. The remaining 128 referees had received petitions in 961 cases, every
one of which had been filed under Section 74. No detailed data was obtained
as to individual cases under Section 75, since all required schedules and informa-
tion in these cases are filed with, and retained by, the conciliation commissioners
whose appointment is required for the carrying out of the terms of the section.
For this same reason by far the greater part of the referees did not direct re-
marks at this Section alone, but addressed their criticisms generally at both
Sections. Nevertheless a few of the referees did discuss Section 75 separately
and the following information was secured as to its operation and reception.
Section 75
Out of the 340 referees who responded to the circular, only seven reported
that conciliation commissioners had been appointed in their districts. Since the
questionnaire asked for the number of cases filed under each referee and did
not specifically ask about the appointment of concilation commissioners, it is
possible that this report is not exhaustive. However, the context of the let-
ters received with the returned questionnaires indicates that except where specifi-
cally mentioned by the referee there were probably no other appointments. It
seems apparent, therefore, that Section 75 has been utilized to a very negligible
degree.
Even where commissioners have been appointed, three referees indicated that
practically no cases have been filed and that after the first enthusiasm for this
new relief had worn off and the provisions more fully understood the petitioning
farmers had completely lost interest. It appears that the most interest shown
in the relief offered by Section 75 has been in the Northern District of Iowa
where seven conciliation commissioners are reported to have been appointed
at the instance of 122 farmers. Situated in the heart of the farm belt, it
would seem that this district would be typical of those areas which were intended
to be benefited by Section 75 and its residents would be the first to recognize
and utilize provisions offering any real relief.1 3 But here no filing of individual
tion. Battle, The Enactment of the New Bankruptcy Law Will Check The Tendency
Toward Current Inflation (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 340; Note (1933) 3 Dzmorr L. Rrv. 131;
Note (1933) 18 ST. Louis L. REv. 324.
13. This territory comprised the heart of the "farm revolt" early in 1933. See N. Y.
Times, April 28, 1933, at 1 [District Judge C. C. Bradley (Iowa) beaten for not complying
with orders of debtor farmers to sign no more foreclosure orders); id. Jan. 17, 1933, at 3
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petitions has followed the appointment of the commissioners, although some
of the commissioners are being utilized privately to effect compromises and
settlements between the farmers and their creditors.14
From the comments afforded by other of the responding referees who sepa-
rately discussed Section 75, it appears that there is more than general apathy
behind this failure to take advantage of it. Probably the most general criti-
cism of the agricultural section is that it is entirely too cumbersome to be put
to practical use. Except in counties wherein the highest degree of cooperation
exists the requirement that 15 farmers sign the petition before a conciliator
can be appointed 1 is regarded as an effective bar to wide-spread use of this
section. Hastily drawn1" and haphazardly amended on the floor of both House
and Senate1 7 it is reported by the referees that the provision is not generally
understood by lawyers or by the referees18 themselves, a fact that further dis-
courages application for relief under it. From the middle west come the highly
pertinent criticisms that the steady decline of farm prices since 1920, the
deflation in land values and the constantly increasing burden of taxes have put
the farmer beyond the need of extensions in his obligations, and that the only
saving cure at this late date would be a sudden rise in prices which, it is said,
probably will not materialize in face of the huge surpluses existing in this
country in all kinds of farm products. Another very logical objection voiced
by a number of referees is that since the greater portion of the debt of practi-
cally every debtor farmer is represented by a mortgage on either land or
chattels or both, the mortgagee is able to dictate the terms of a composition or
extension under this section, his consent being necessary to meet the require-
ment that a majority in amount and number of creditors agree to terms. Con-
sequently it is difficult to obtain a better settlement under this provision than
could be privately negotiated without the expense of judicial proceedings. 19
A further recurring criticism is to the effect that even where fifteen farmers
(farmers halt foreclosure sales); id. Jan. 5, 1933, at 14 (farmers halt foreclosure sale by
lynching threat) ; id. April 29, 1933, at 1 (mobs block foreclosure sales; Iowa troops called
to rule riot area).
14. The failure to proceed further under this section is probably partly due to the leg-
islative moratorium on farm debts under which foreclosures may be postponed until
1935 by application to the court. See Iowa Acts 1933, c. 182.
15. See Section 74a. It has been judicially decided that no individual petitions can
be filed unless a conciliation commissioner has been appointed for the county of which the
petitioner is a resident. In re Oeterritter, 3 F. Supp. 674 (S. D. Tex. 1933). See also
General Order N. (50) § 2, 11 U. S. C. A. § 53 (1933).
16. See remarks of Senators Blaine and Patman, 75 CoNG. REc. 2929, 4910 (1933).
17. Senator LaFollette: ". . . it would be better for the Committee on the Judiciary
to take the bill over the week-end, and endeavor to work out something which it could
sponsor and recommend, than it would be for us to proceed here on the floor of the
Senate to try and write as important a piece of legislation as this. Senators will recall
that in connection with important bills where we have attempted to do that, from the
point of view of technical draftsmanship they should bring a blush of shame to the face
of every Senator who had anything to do with them." 75 CONG. REc. 4885 (1933).
13. See comments in articles cited in note 7, supra.
19. See Section 75g.
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are able to agree on the appointment of a conciliator, the inadequacy of the
compensation of $10 per case afforded this official by the Act 20 prohibits any-
one with the necessary capabilities for effectively administering the provisions
of this section from accepting the position. In several states referees report
that local moratoria have obviated the necessity of resorting to provisions of this
nature, and in other states it is reported that the advantages of compositions
and extensions are nullified by generous exemption provisions in state laws,
so that outright adjudication in bankruptcy, with a complete discharge of prov-
able debts, is more desirable. Although the criticisms of the referees in re-
gard to this section may be objected to on the ground that they are not based
on actual experience, the unanimity of opinion adverse to the practicability of
this section and the slight extent to which it has been used indicate that it ap-
parently does not furnish a relief adapted to the needs of the persons it seeks to
help.
Section 74
A slightly different picture is presented by the 961 cases filed under section
74, which were distributed as follows:
Table I.
Number of referees reporting.
I case ....................... 40 9 cases ..................... 3
2 cases ....................... 39 10 cases ..................... 1
3 cases ...................... 14 11 cases ..................... 1
4 cases ....................... 9 13 cases ..................... 1
S cases ...................... 7 26 cases ..................... 1
6 cases ....................... 5 27 cases ..................... 1
7 cases ...................... 2 74 cases ..................... 1
8 cases ...................... 2 482 cases ..................... 1
Even though it appears from the above figures that a substantial number of
individuals have filed for relief under this section, its limited appeal is indicated
by its negligible use in a large number of districts and disuse in many more.
The restricted application for relief under this section is further emphasized by
comparing with the 961 cases filed in the past year under this provision the
62,256 cases filed under all sections of the Bankruptcy Act during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1933.21 Nevertheless it has not been as completely dis-
regarded as has Section 75.
Analysis of the cases by types of debtors shows that a great majority of the
debtors seeking relief under Section 74 were wage earners, as shown in the fol-
lowing table:
20. Section 75b.
21. REP. ATr'" Gxw. (1933) 148. Of course this figure is not entirely comparable to
the number of cases filed under Section 74 since it includes petitions by and against corpora-
tions. However, the fact that 34,386 of the petitions were filed by wage earners, farmers
and members of professions is indicative of the fact that the greater part of the total
petitions filed under all sections is accounted for by individuals.
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Table II
Distribution by nature of debtor.
Wage earners .................. 638
Merchants ................... 109
Manufacturers ................ 16




The relief to the wage earner class has not, however, been geographically
wide-spread, for all but 39 of the cases of this type were reported by the referees
from Birmingham, Alabama (where a special referee has been appointed to
take care of cases arising under this section); Atlanta, Georgia; Knoxville,
Tennessee, and Norfolk , Virginia. The reason for this concentration is largely
a matter of conjecture. In Birmingham, where 482 wage earner petitions have
been filed, the large number of such cases has been attributed2 2 to the severe
garnishment statutes in Alabama.23 However, the special referee administering
these cases indicates a more astute guess to be that debtors in this territory
have become bankruptcy-minded by the popularization given in the last few
years to relief under the regular sections of the Act24 and are hence quick
to utilize new relief emanating from the same source. It has been suggested
that this provision has been utilized by wage earners in Atlanta, Georgia,
because relief from wage assignments has not been available under the regular
sections of the Act, the Georgia courts having held that such assignments were
not dischargeable in bankruptcy,25 and the 66 cases in Atlanta are thought to
have generally been effective to relieve the debtors from usurious money lenders
who have involved them with wage assignments. That something else might
be involved, however, is suggested by the fact that in Macon, Georgia, no such
petitions were filed and there the appeal of this provision is seriously dis-
counted .2  In Norfolk, Virginia, where 26 wage earners filed petitions for
22. See The Birmingham Post, May 14, 1933, at 1.
23. But see Sturges and Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487, 502-513, wherein collection remedies in Alabama are analyzed
and compared with other states, indicating that these remedies are no more harsh for
example than those in New England where very few petitions have been reported as filed
under this section.
24. See Sturges and Cooper, supra note 23, at 24, for an analysis indicating that
Alabama is a leader in wage earner bankruptcies.
25. The effect of these state decisions has recently been nullified by the Supreme Court's
holding that such wage assignments are dischargeable in bankruptcy. Land Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 54 Sup. Ct. 695 (1934).
26. One conclusion which may be drawn, however, is that there were no wage as-
signments in Macon. Such a conclusion is strengthened by the suggestion of the Macon
referee that no cases were filed in his district since the liberal exemption laws in Georgia
made outright adjudication more attractive, which would be true only in absence of wage
assignments which under Georgia law would (previous to the decision mentioned in note
25, supra) nullify the advantages of exemptions as to assets.
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compositions or extensions, this section has been regarded as making available
needed relief to meritorious debtors who have received discharges in bank-
ruptcy within six years and are therefore precluded from securing relief under
the old composition sections of the Bankruptcy Act.27 On the other hand, in
Knoxville, Tennessee, where debtors have been prompted by the same motive
to apply for relief under the new section, the results are indicated as being less
successful.
From the foregoing discussion no conclusion can be drawn except that under
Section 74 wage earners are able to find some degree of relief. What factors
will produce a need for this relief, however, is not wholly clear and it is not
known why there should be such a concentration of cases of this nature,
although it may be stated negatively that this concentration does not seem to
have resulted from any inherent limitation on the practicability of the relief
offered.
In the cases where other than wage earners were petitioners the cases are
more widely scattered. Here again the distribution and number of cases filed
seems to have no particular significance beyond the already apparent fact that
the use of this provision has been relatively restricted. But in spite of its limited
application, it has afforded relief to a fair portion of its applicants, as is shown




Nature of debtors Extension or Adjudication Dismissal Pending Total
Composition in Bankruptcy
Merchant 48 33 10 18 109
Manufacturer 7 3 4 2 16
Other entrepreneurs 17 12 1 11 41
Farmers 12 6 16 30 64
Professional 1 4 3 5 13
Miscellaneous 11 11 6 9 37
Total 96 69 40 75 280
The reporting referees have indicated that in some cases needed relief in the
form of compositions and extensions has been obtained by virtue of this section.
Thus in a few instances it has afforded relief to debtors burdened with real
estate which has undergone abnormal price depreciation during the depression
but which has promise of revived earning power in the future. In other cases
27. The provision in Section 14a(5) against discharge of a debtor who has received
a discharge within six years would seem to preclude such a debtor from obtaining a con-
firmation of a composition under Section 12, since Section 14c makes such a confirmation
a discharge of all dischargeable debts not assumed in the composition. Thus to make Sec-
tions 12 and 13 comparable in this respect to Section 74 it would be necessary to amend
Section 14a(5) or Section 14c.
28. The data in this table does not include all petitions other than wage earners which
were reported by the responding referees, since in some cases no disposition was indicated.
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it has afforded a desired delay to land and home owners during pendency of
applications for government aid. And in still other cases, where the debtor has
promise of rehabilitating himself in a manner that would be impossible if his
assets were presently liquidated, it is conceded that this opportunity should be
allowed and has been made possible by this section.
Of primary interest is the concensus of opinion of the reporting referees as
to the practicability of this section. In this respect, 230 referees ventured no
opinion although 82 of these 230 had administered cases under it. Opinions
were, however, expressed by 110 referees of which number 46 had administered
650 cases while the other 64 referees had merely their past experience with
debtor proceedings upon which to base their judgment.
Table IV.
Distribution of cases administered by commenting referees.
1 case ....................... 15 7 cases ...................... 2
2 cases ...................... 11 9 cases ..................... 2
3 cases ...................... 4 10 cases ..................... 1
4 cases ...................... 2 11 cases ..................... 1
5 cases ...................... 4 26 cases ..................... 1
6 cases ...................... 2 482 cases .................... 1
Of the 110 referees stating an opinion, 10 were favorable to the new section
on the ground that it afforded a needed relief while the remaining 100 were
unfavorable. It is interesting to note that 8 of the 10 favorable referees had
administered cases under section 74 and that these 8 referees had in all 536
such cases; on the other hand only 37 of the 100 unfavorable referees had
administered cases under section 74, these 37 referees had 114 cases and
the greater part of them had experience with only 1 or 2 cases. Thus the
reaction of the referees seems to vary according to the degree of familiarity
they have acquired with the actual application of the section to debtor problems,
their opinions becoming more favorable with experience. 29 And since part of
the adverse opinions is not based on experience under the new section, while
much of the balance is based on only a slight experience, the same criticism may
be directed against them as was advanced against the objections raised prior to
operation of the new provision. On the other hand it must be admitted that
these opinions, though objectionable on the ground that they are theoretical,
and though in large part a reflection of those directed against this section
prior to its enactment and operation, are the opinions of persons having con-
siderable experience with debtor problems.
The most frequent criticisms were those directed against the nature of
relief offered by supervised extensions and compositions. The opinion is recur-
rent that when a debtor reaches such financial straits that it is necessary to ask
for governmental intervention, generally compositions and extensions are of
little value. The idea that compositions and extensions will aid debtors proceeds
29. Allowance must be made for the distortion of this figure by the 482 cases adminis-
tered by the one referee.
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on the theory that given time the debtor will be able to rehabilitate himself. A
good many referees indicate that what actually happens is merely a retardation
of financial death, since in most cases the factors which have led to the original
distress of the debtor are not abated by a mere extension of time or a reduction
of the amount ultimately to be paid.2 ° Two referees who expressed approval
of this section point out that where a debtor's affairs have suffered from lack
of business ability, the causes of his failure may be removed under this section
by the appointment of a receiver of superior ability to manage the debtor's af-
fairs. At the same time other referees insist that it is entirely too optimistic
to expect that where a business has been the victim of mismanagement it has
much chance of being revived by an officer of the court. Experience with equity
receivers similarly belies such optimism.3' Where the debtor has been the
victim of an unfortunate incidence or unusual circumstances have impaired his
assets but it appears that his earning power still renders him a reasonably good
credit risk, it is thought that creditors will cooperate without governmental
intervention, leaving only hopeless or exceptional cases which need be admin-
istered under governmental care. Although this may generally be true, there is
nothing to indicate that a secured creditor will be willing to wait if his own
ends are better served by immediate enforcement of his lien to the detriment
of all other parties concerned. Extensions and compositions are also thought
inapplicable to the ordinary wage earner case since frequently the excess of in-
come over expenses is so small that liquidation of outstanding debts can be made
only at a very slow rate requiring a great length of time for any substantial
reduction to be made. This is considered unduly burdensome on the debtor
and of little value to the creditor in view of the size of payments and the
trouble entailed in collecting them. For this reason outright adjudication is
thought much more desirable for the average wage earner, and this would seem
especially true in those states having liberal exemption statutes. One may
well be skeptical of these remarks, however, since they were offered by referees
having practically no experience with this type of case and are not confirmed by
the few referees reporting the majority of cases of this type.
A second group of criticisms has to do with the adequacy of the provisions
of this particular section. First, it is the general opinion that most distressed
debtors have been forced to give mortgages and security for a major part of their
debt. Since an extension or composition must have the consent of creditors
holding a majority in the amount of claims in order to become effective under
this section, 32 this precludes settlement in many cases because secured creditors
30. This opinion is substantiated by recent surveys which show that poor business
methods and practices are the prime contributing factors in business failures. See Causes of
Business Fauilres and Bankruptcies of Individuals in New Jersey in 1929-1930, (1931)
DomEsTic Com. Sasms No. 54; Credit Extension and Causes of Failure Among Philadel-
phia Grocers, (1929) TRAi INw. BuILL. No. 627 (1929) (both publications of the Depart-
ment of Commerce).
31. See Douglas, Equity Receiverships in the United States District Court for Con-
necticut (1930) 4 Comz. BAR J. 1, 5.
32. See Section 74e.
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have much less to gain by a delay than general creditors and are likely to
demand immediate enforcement of their claims. Even where secured creditors
do participate in settlements, they can dictate the terms of the agreement
because of their preferred position, and consequently no advantage over set-
tling by private negotiation is gained by appeal to this section. Second, com-
positions are thought to be not generally feasible where the consideration is
cash, since the act requires the consideration to be paid immediately 33 and this
is likely to drain the debtor's business of all its working capital, making ulti-
mate failure a certainty.S4 That these factors do limit the effect of the section
can hardly be doubted. A third objection is to the effect that this section pro-
vides for no discharge such as is given to debtors under Sections 12 and 13 by
virtue of Section 14(c). However, it would seem that provision for a discharge
is hardly necessary in view of the fact that it can in effect be accomplished by
formulating the terms of the composition to this end; and the absence of a
specific provision for discharge extends the application of this section by
allowing debtors who have received discharges within six years to avail them-
selves of this provision, a result which would probably be precluded under
Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act were it provided that the confirmation of
an extension or composition were to act as a discharge.3 5 A fourth and con-
stantly recurring criticism is directed toward the cumbersome and ambiguous
wording of the section3" which is said to complicate administration. Actually,
however, the wording of this provision seems sufficiently clear to afford a work-
ing basis upon which to administer the relief offered in this section; this objec-
tion appears to be an unconscious resistance to new and uncharted procedure
rather than a real objection to the utility of the section.
Finally, aside from any consideration of the merit of Section 74, it has been
criticized as being entirely needless on the ground that Sections 12 and 13 of
the Act are capable of affording the same relief, and with more facility be-
cause of the well-developed procedure which has grown up around these sec-
tions.37  At the most it has been observed that the same results could have
been obtained by a few simple amendments of the old composition sections
which would include giving the referees power to confirm settlements for the
purpose of speeding up administration,38 and allowing extensions in addition
33. Ibid.
34. This criticism is not necessarily applicable to all compositions since often the consid-
eration is time notes. However, the debtor may be forced to pay cash by pressure from
the creditor, and when this situation occurs the criticism is relevant.
35. See Section 75g.
36. Compare criticisms in articles cited in note 7, supra.
37. But see DoNovAN, ADArNsTRATIox oF BAN.RuPr ESTATEs-HousE Comrr
PRINT, 71st Cong. 3d Sess. (1931), wherein procedure under Sections 12 and 13 of the
Bankruptcy Act, as supplemented by General Order XLI, is regarded as cumbersome be-
yond effective administration. Procedure in the Southern District of New York is also crit-
icized as seriously obstructing relief under these sections.
33. Now provided for in 74f, and recommended in Donovan, op. cit. supra note 37, at
116-117, as being a prerequisite of more effective administration.
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to compositions.30 And it has been pointed out that the old sections are even
more extensive in application since they include corporations. But in spite of
the fact that a great majority of the referees regard Section 74 as useless be-
cause of its repetitious nature, it should not be condemned without better rea-
son. The mere embodiment of this relief in a special measure passed ostensibly
for the relief of the "debtor" has sought to vitalize it, and has apparently suc-
ceeded to the extent that it has been invoked to a greater degree than the
old composition sections.
40
From an analysis of the above criticisms it appears that by far the most
serious is that directed at the scope of this section, rather than to its effective-
ness in the limited type of case to which it has seemingly been applied. To the
extent that this section was expected to check liquidation 4 1 or to effect a panacea
for distressed debtors, these criticisms are well taken. However, that no such
purpose was intended to be effected by operation of this section is implicit in
its terms.42  The fact that compositions or extensions may be effected only
with the consent of a majority of creditors in amount and number, indicates an
intention to give relief only in those limited cases where a debt reprieve is not
likely to injure the creditors and will help the debtor. While perhaps debtors
could receive more general relief under this section were referees given power
to confirm compositions or extensions without the consent of a majority of
creditors, the criticisms of this section in light of a purpose which it could
hardly be expected to accomplish should not be allowed to obscure the fact
that within its limited purpose it is apparently capable of furnishing needed
relief. Furthermore, in contrast to the criticisms which many referees have
directed at the adequacy of the section to perform even its limited function,
those referees who feel that a needed relief is provided by it have not advanced
such objections but have apparently found it workable. Indeed it is difficult to
conceive that a method would not be both limited and complex if its purpose is
to readjust, and at the same time protect, the rights of a group of creditors;
for the problems thus presented are in themselves complicated. Valid criticism
of the operation of the section could more properly be advanced if it is sub-
39. This change is not vital, however, since as a practical matter extensions can now be
effected under Section 12 by an agreement between the debtor and his creditors that the
consideration for the composition will be time notes signed by the debtor.
40. The 340 responding referees have reported more confirmations of extensions and
compositions under Section 74 during the first year of its operation than the confirma-
tions from all districts under Sections 12 and 13 during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1932. REP. ATr'y GmN. (1932) 247. Since the confirmations under 12 and 13 include con-
firmations of corporate compositions, it is dear that individuals have made much greater
use of Section 74 than they ever made of the old composition sections.
41. This was one reason why President Hoover urged the passage of this section. See 4
CONG. REc. 1569, 1615 (1933).
42. In outlining the purpose of this section to the Senate its author, Senator Hastings,
made the following remarks: "It is not expected that this will work any wonders. The
chances are all of the provisions will not be applicable to more than a small percentage
of distressed, but it is believed it reaches a sufficient number to warrant the Senate giving
immediate and careful consideration to it." 75 CONG. RFc. 4876 (1933).
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sequently seen that the supposed relief so far granted is in fact illusory and
only delays liquidation that might better have taken place at once. At the
present time the objections mainly indicate a general misapprehension of the
function this provision is intended to perform-a misunderstanding that may
have been shared by the persons who urged its adoption-and also indicate
general reluctance to recognize the utility of untried procedure.
THE N. R. A. AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS:
THE SUGAR INSTITUTE CASE
THE precise status of the Sherman Law under the National Industrial Recovery
Act' is difficult of determination. The N. R. A. specifically suspends the
operation of the anti-trust laws wherever a code has been promulgated.2  Yet
while thus apparently legalizing combinations in restraint of trade, it never-
theless retains much of the spirit of the anti-trust laws in that it attempts to
prevent code groups from adopting monopolistic methods, which congressional
leaders still believe are harmful to the public welfare. Thus the recovery
statute provides that before the President may approve any code he must
be satisfied that it is not designed to promote monopolies, to eliminate or oppress
small enterprises, or to operate discriminately against them; 3 and apparently
feeling that these instructions were insufficient safeguards, Congress specific-
ally proscribed all codes that do permit monopolies or monopolistic practices.
4
This paradoxical combination of suspending the anti-trust laws and yet con-
tinuing opposition to monopoly is, in large measure, the result of amendments
to the recovery bill on the floor of Congress and by the conference committee.5
But the spirit of the Sherman act that has thus been preserved lacks adequate
methods for its effective judicial enforcement where a code is in force. Since
the heads of the Department of Justice hold office during the President's
pleasure that organization very probably will not attack as monopolistic the
provisions of any code approved by him.6 And while the Federal Trade Com-
mission's powers are specifically left unaltered by the N. R. A., that body by
its denunciation yet toleration of the monopolistic practices under the steel
codes has likewise indicated that it has for the present shifted responsibility
1. P. L. No. 90, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
2. Id.§5.
3. Id. § 3 (a).
4. Id. § 3 (a).
5. Handler, The National Industrial Recovery Act. (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 440, 443; 77
CONa. REc. 5264, 5382, 5933, 5939 (1933).
6. Since the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act the U. S. Department of
Justice has instituted nine cases under the Sherman Law; none of these, however, involve
codes adopted under the recovery legislation. Information as to the nature of these suits
was supplied by the Department of Justice.
7. N.R.A. § 3 (b).
8. United States News, March 26, 1934, at 12.
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to the White House. The sole remaining method of enforcing the anti-trust
and fair practices sections of the Sherman and Clayton acts-suit for damages
by an injured competitor or customer-has proven ineffective as a result
primarily of the legal rule that the plaintiff must not merely prove restraint of
trade but also demonstrate that his financial loss was caused by the manipula-
tions of the defendant.9 Thus it would appear that under the guise of a code
an industry could insulate itself from judicial interference with its pursuit
of previously illegal practices.
In the light of this amorphous status of the anti-trust laws today, the recent
decision in the Sugar Institute case,'0 which treated the facts as though the
recovery legislation had not been enacted," offers an opportunity for analysis
and comparison of trade association law before the New Deal and under its in-
dustrial codes. Prior to the formation of the Sugar Institute in 1927, the
domestic cane sugar refining business manifested the worst elements of American
business individualism. The several independent and competing refiners, con-
fronted with post-war over-production,' 2 a glutted market, and pressure from
large industrial consumers and distributers of sugar,13 engaged in ingenious de-
vices for the granting of secret concessions to incur the favor of customers.
14
Desirous of presenting a united front against the large consumers whom the
refiners blamed for their troubles and desirous of eliminating competitive meth-
ods in order to maintain the price structure more effectively, the Institute drew
up a Code of Ethics' 5 which provided for the sale of sugar only upon open prices
and publicly announced terms, forbade price changes without notice, and
abolished quantity discounts and special allowances to customers. 16 The Insti-
9. Keogh v. Chicago and North Western Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 156 (1922); Jack v.
Armour and Co., 291 Fed. 741 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
10. United States v. Sugar Institute (S. D. N. Y. 1934). Not yet reported; all
citations to the case are to a mimeographed copy of the opinion.
11. "Some months ago, a conference was had with counsel respecting the effects on
this case of the recent A. A. A. and N. R. A. legislation and of any code that may be
approved pursuant thereto. It was agreed . . .that at any rate until such a code shall
have been formulated and approved, this case had not become moot. In the circum-
stances, it has seemed best fully to consider and to decide the case as submitted; if and
when a code shall have been approved for this industry, the injunction decree may be
modified or suspended to the extent, if any, thereby made necessary." Mimeographed
opinion, at 183.
12. Mimeographed opinion, at 9.
13. The principal consumers of sugar are candy manufacturers, canneries, and soft
drinks bottlers.
14. Long term contracts with special terms, quantity discounts, tolling (i. e. the pur-
chase of raw sugar by a consumer, the delivery of it to the refiner, and the securing from
the latter of' an equivalent amount of refined sugar minus a quantity for the processing),
rebates on bags, private brands, freight differentials, resale of "spoiled" sugar, storage
at brokers' and customers' warehouses were among the various devices for deviating from
the open market price. Defendant's Fact Brief, at 2-12; Mimeographed opinion, at 6-9.
15. Mimeographed opinion, appendix.
16. The Institute forbade changes from previously announced prices without 18 hours
notice; it abolished quantity discounts, special allowances for brokerage or storage or
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tute enforced its code and its interpretations of it by pressure against recalci-
trant refiners and by boycotts against disobedient brokers and warehousemen-
7
In 1931 the U. S. Department of Justice petitioned the district court for the
dissolution of the Institute and for the enjoining of its specified practices. The
government contended that the Institute's application of its Code of Ethics,
the practices it fostered under the guise of the Code of Ethics, and its failure
to distribute its statistical information to sugar consumers destroyed the possi-
bility of a free competitive market and resulted in a combination aimed at an
artificial maintenance of high prices.' 8 The Institute denied that its objective
was price fixing, insisting that it was merely endeavoring to eliminate those
forms of customer discrimination that the Clayton Act forbade, and urged
that its program was essential to eradicate the chaos of the pre-Institute
period.10 After lengthy consideration of the case, Judge Mack recently en-
joined the Institute from carrying on the activities that led to price maintenance
and destroyed competition on the ground that it went further than was neces-
sary for the solution of the sugar problems; but he refused to decree its
dissolution because, divorced from its illegalities, the Institute offers oppor-
tunities for the elimination of conditions subversive of sound competition.
The practices of the Sugar Institute barred by this decision are in many
essential respects similar to the terms of the codes drawn up under the authority
of the National Industrial Recovery Act. In fact the code of fair competition
presented by the beet sugar industry was almost an exact duplication of the
Institute's Code of Ethics.20 The new agreements, like that of the Sugar
Institute and the other pre-New Deal trade associations, have as their major
objective the maintenance of the price structure. In return for increases in
employment and wage payrolls, the recovery administration has virtually given
industry carte blanche for the elimination of those trade practices that pro-
duced cut-throat competition and has provided business organizations with
cocperative machinery whereby they can uniformly pass on to the consumer
the higher costs resulting from their concessions to labor.21  Likewise, the
specific mechanics for the maintenance of the price structure employed by the
new codes resemble, in essence, those employed by the Sugar Institute and
enjoined in other trade association prosecutions.2 2 Among such prohibitions
advertising, the sale of second-hand sugar, delayed or split billings, and the sale of sugar
for export under contracts which did not provide for shipments out of the country; and
to avoid freight differentials, sugar was to be quoted at delivered prices.
17. Mimeographed opinion, at 28-42.
18. Petitioner's Brief.
19. Defendant's Fact Brief, esp. 12-21.
20. Action on the cane and beet sugar codes was postponed, probably because of the
pendency of the Institute case and of congressional legislation on the subject of sugar.
On May 4, 1934, Congress amended the Agricultural Adjustment Act so as to bring sugar
within the scope of that legislation. Action thereunder has not yet been taken.
21. Isaacs and Taeusch, The NIRA in the Book and in Business (1934) 47 HAxv.
L. Rnv. 458, 469.
22. In order to see more clearly the relation of the old trade association cases and the
new Recovery Code it is significant to note that, under the anti-trust laws, agreements
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in the new codes are below cost selling,23 secret rebates, 24 the giving of credit
below the regular finance rates,25 the allowance of longer credit periods than
those set forth in the code schedule,26 loss leaders, 27 excessive trade-in values,28
advertising allowances, 29 excessive transportation allowances,30 guarantees
against price declines, 31 consignment sales,32 drop shipments.as Consequent-
ly it would appear that by adopting a code under the N. R. A. and securing
executive approval thereto the Sugar Institute could not only avoid judicial
interference, but could enjoy executive sanction in so doing.
However, despite the points of similarity between the practices permissible
under a code and the practices forbidden to the Sugar Institute under the anti-
trust laws, it is possible to distinguish the former from the latter in two
important respects. In the first place, the Institute-and this same remark
is true of most trade associations-represented a single, horizontal section of
the industry; brokers, warehousemen, and industrial consumers had no official
voice in its decisions. Unfortunately, a similar segregation of functional groups
binding a substantial portion of an industry that were construed to be agreements to
fix prices were held illegal regardless of the reasonableness of the prices. Chattanooga
Foundry and Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906); United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific
States Paper Trade Association, 273 U. S. 52 (1927); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927); KiRsH, TRADe ASSOCIATIONs-TuH LEGAL AsPEcTS (1928) 30;
Jaffe and Tobriner, The Legality of Price Fixing Agreements (1932) 45 HAgv. L. REv. 1164.
Similarly, restrictions on production aimed at raising prices were held illegal [American
Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377 (1921)], and so have been
attempts to eliminate new competition [Thomas v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917)], and
apportionment of production among producers [Addystone Pipe and Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899)3. The exchange of statistical information, where the ob-
jective is price maintenance, has been declared illegal. United States v. American Linseed
Oil Co.; American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, both supra. For the prac-
tices declared illegal in the instant case see note 16, supra.
23. E.g. Retail Stores, Electrical Manufacturers, Luggage and Leather Goods, Lumber
and Timber, Textile Machinery Codes.
24. E.g. Bituminous Coal, Boilers, Glass Containers, Handkerchief, Hosiery, Ice, Iron
and Steel, Retail Motor Vehicles, Oil Burners, Petroleum, Retail Lumber, Underwear,
Wall-paper Codes.
25. E.g. Motor Vehicle Code.
26. E.g. Petroleum Code.
27. E.g. Retail Store Code.
28. E.g. Motor Vehicles, Oil Burners, Knitting Machinery, Laundry Machinery Codes.
29. E.g. Ice, Artificial Flowers, Luggage and Leather Goods Codes.
30. E.g. Handkerchief Code.
31. E.g. Handkerchief, Silk Codes.
32. E.g. Lime Code.
33. E.g. Saddlery Code. Other prohibitions found in the recovery codes that re-
semble the practices under the Sugar Institute and the other earlier trade associations are:
false invoicing (Ice, Laundry Machinery, Artificial Flowers Codes), predating and post-
dating of invoices (Bituminous Coal, Iron and Steel, Retail Lumber, Textile Bags Codes),
sale of perfect goods as "seconds" (Umbrella Code), special cartons (Boot and Shoe Code).
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in an industry characterizes the new codes; 34 and there, too, organized producers
employ their strategic positions to force their demands upon other groups in
the distribution process. However, integration of industrial rule-making is
possible under the recovery codes. Should the President so insist, the code
authority for any given industry could be made to represent the various
vertical sections in the production-marketing process and thereby to perform
the important function of codperatively solving their interrelated problems.
Consumer rights in the New Deal, now hopelessly entrusted to the stifled Con-
sumers' Advisory Board,35 could likewise be given expression through such
a functionally representative code authority. The motion picture code author-
ity with its representatives of producers and independent exhibitors, is a move
in that right direction. The second possible, but unfortunately still theoreti-
cal,30 point of differentiation between the condemned Sugar Institute Code
of Ethics and the parallel recovery codes lies in the mechanics for checkmating
practices that prove harmful to other sections of an industry or to the public.
Prior to the operation of a new code, presidential sanction is essential;3 7 after
the adoption of the code, its terms may be changed by executive order; 38 and
similarly the President may order the cessation of undesirable practices per-
petuated under the guise of a code. Of special significance is the constant avail-
ability to the government of the code authority's records and the consequent
greater ease in detecting abuses. Such administrative prevention and amend-
ment should prove a simpler device for the elimination of abuses than the
former lengthy judicial actions for the abolition of trade associations or the
enjoinment of their unfair practices.39 These theoretically present differences
between the Sugar Institute agreement and the recovery codes may give mean-
ing to Judge Mack's decision. Thus while it is possible for the sugar industry
in large part to nullify his decree merely by drafting a new code and by setting
up the old, non-representative Sugar Institute as its code authority--presiden-
tial rejection of such a code being the only obstacle-nevertheless, should
executive supervision become effective or should the code authority be made
functionally representative of the entire sugar industry, the court's injunction
will not thus be made futile.
34. Thus in the case of textiles vertical and horizontal segregation is illustrated by the
presence of separate codes and code authorities for cotton manufacturing, silk manufactur-
ing, woolen manufacturing, textile processing, commission merchants, small cotton wares,
and so on.
35. Isaacs and Taeusch, supra note 21, at 461.
36. To date the major executive disapprovals of proposed code provisions have con-
cerned their labor clauses.
37. See note 3, supra.
38. N.R.A.§§3 (a),3 (d),4 (b).
39. For data on the lack of success in enforcing the Sherman Act and the reasons there-
for, see address by W. H. Hamilton, reported in Tmz FEDERAL Arim-TRusr LAWS: A
S-:xosIurm (1932) 5, 6-14.
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NECESSITY FOR HEARING BEFORE ENFORCING ORDER
OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
THE Denison Act1 as amended in 19282 confers upon the Interstate Commerce
Commission authority to grant to a petitioning barge line a certificate of public
necessity, 3 and thereupon without hearing to enter an order requiring connect-
ing rail-carriers to join with the barge line in establishing through joint routes
and joint rates and also divisions of such rates. Upon complaint of the rail
carriers the Commission is authorized, after reasonable notice, to hold an
informal hearing in which the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of
the order is placed on the complainants. 4 In compliance with this statute,
the American Barge Line applied to the Commission, received a certificate, and
an order was issued to connecting rail carriers to join with the barge line in
establishing minimum differentials between all-rail and barge-rail rates on
certain routes according to a specified formula.0 Subsequently the rail car-
riers put into effect a special low rate on carload lots to which the existing
differentials did not apply. Upon petition by the barge line, but again with-
out hearing, the Commission issued a second supplemental order requiring the
carriers to establish minimum differentials as to those rates also.6 Instead of
invoking the available statutory procedure the carriers petitioned the Com-
mission to vacate its order and hold a full hearing. Failing in this, they sought
injunctive relief before a three-judge federal court. An injunction issued, the
court finding that the statute did not require a hearing before the effective
date of the order and that it was therefore unconstitutional. 7 The Supreme
Court, in reversing this decision,8 read into the statute a requirement making
it the duty of the Commission to hold a hearing upon complaint and to suspend
1. Inland Waterways Corporation Act, 43 STAT. 360 (1924), 49 U. S. C. §§ 151-156
(1926).
2. 45 STAT. 978 (1928), 49 U. S. C. Supp. VII § 153e (1933).
3. A certificate is not a prerequisite to carrying on business as a common carrier, but
merely to receiving the benefits of the provisions of this section. See Procedure under
Barge Line Act, 148 I. C. C. 129, 134 (1928).
4. Commissioner Eastman in Procedure Under Barge Line Act, supra note 3, at 138,
said: "In our opinion the only rational interpretation of the above-quoted provision is
that it is an attempt to substitute for Ghearings prior to our orders . . . subsequent
hearings upon complaint." Commissioner Brainerd, in a concurring opinion in which
he was joined by Commissioner Farrel, was of the opinion that it would be the duty of
the Commission upon complaint to hold a hearing, at the same time suspending the
effective date of the order. Id. at 141.
5. Application of American Barge Line Company, 182 I. C. C. 521 (1932).
6. Application of American Barge Line Company, 190 I. C. C. 177 (1932). Commis-
sioner Mahaffie (one of three in the division which decided this case) dissented on the
ground that the statutory procedure was not required in supplemental proceedings and
that a record was necessary here for an intelligent decision.
7. Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Del. 1933).
8. United States v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., 54 S. Ct. 471 (1934).
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the effective date of the ex parte order until its completion.0 The procedure
as thus limited was held to satisfy the requirements of due process of law.'0
The difficulty in reconciling the pressing need for governmental efficiency
with the just protection of individual rights has led to varying interpretations
of the procedural requirements of "due process of law" in connection with
administrative action." Insofar as the exigencies of different administrative
problems permit, the courts have uniformly insisted upon careful deliberation
before governmental action may be taken which directly affects private rights.
Notice and hearing prior to any action are therefore ordinarily required as
the basis of an administrative body's orders 12 and the findings of fact upon
which such orders are based may be conclusive only when supported by evi-
dence.' 3 But in some fields of governmental activity practical considerations
make deliberate administrative procedure of this character impossible. Thus
in the fields of assessment for taxes,' 4 for local benefits,'- and in eminent
domain proceedings' 6 the number of cases handled and their nature preclude
9. Mr. Justice Sutherland in his opinion relies on the position taken by the govern-
ment and the Commission in their briefs and on an answer by the Assistant Solicitor General
to a direct question from the bench to the effect that the Commission considered itself
thus bound and had adopted the view taken by Commissioner Brainerd in Procedure
Under Barge Line Act, 144 I. C. C. 129 (1928), as their own.
10. Mr. Justice Stone, writing a dissenting opinion with which Justices Brandeis, Roberts
and Cardozo concurred, saw no occasion "to resort to admissions of counsel in brief and
argument to define that duty," and it seems likely that these Justices were willing to
uphold the procedure as written.
11. For a general treatment of the subject of administrative law see DicxIsoN,
ADMI'NISTRATIVE JUSTICE Am Tm SuPRErcY oF LAW (1927); FREuim, ADmINSTRATIvE
Powrms OVER PEmsoqs AND PROPERTY (1928). Notice and hearing are dealt with in Note
(1931) SO U. or PA. L. REV. 96; Note (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 878; Note (1934) 34 COL.
L. REv. 332.
12. Thus hearings are required in public utility regulation [Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co., 227 U. S. 88 (1913); Chicago, Milwaukee
and St. Paul Rr. v. Railroad Commissioners, 76 Mont. 305, 247 Pac. 162 (1926); City of
New York v. Citizens' Water Supply Co., 189 N. Y. Supp. 929 (Sup. Ct. 1921)] in zoning
cases [It re Cobb, 128 Misc. 67, 217 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Sup. Ct. 1926)] and in workmen's
compensation cases [see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 48 (1932)]. But see La Crosse
v. Railroad Commission, 172 Wis. 233, 178 N. W. 867 (1920) (temporary rate alteration
in emergency allowed while hearing was taking place).
13. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville Rr. Co., 227 U. S. 88
(1913); Tagg Brothers and Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930). This is
not true when constitutional issues are raised. Cf. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920). Nor does it preclude review of "jurisdictional" facts.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
14. Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660 (1890); Wells Fargo Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S.
165 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of California v. McLaughlin, 55 F. (2d) 274 (N. D. Cal.
1932).
15. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1877); Hagar v. Reclamation District
No. 108, 111 U. S. 701 (1884); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1908).
16. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57 (1919); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268
U. S. 276 (1925).
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the allowance of a prior administrative hearing as the basis for each order."
Accordingly in these fields the constitution has been held to permit an ex parte
determination where there is also the right to demand a hearing before a higher
administrative board, but the findings of fact upon which such orders are based
are not ordinarily made conclusive in the courts.1 s Even greater deviation from
the normal requirement is sanctioned in other fields. For example, in the
dismissal of government employees,19 the closing of insolvent banks,20 the
issuance of the Interstate Commerce Commission's emergency car-service
orders,2 ' and in the abatement of public nuisances, 22 where to defer effective
action until the completion of an administrative hearing would be to defeat
the purpose of that action, a hearing is completely dispensed with. In these
instances an individual's remedy for an improper order lies in a suit for an
injunctiofn, or an action for damages against the enforcing official. 23  More-
over, except in the nuisance field where the aggrieved party has in some cases
been held entitled to a trial de novo,24 judicial review of these orders is appar-
ently confined to questions of law.as
17. In the evaluation of property for customs purposes essentially the same procedure
is used [Origet v. Hedden, 155 U. S. 228 (1894)], and apparently formerly in the field
of immigration control [Nishimura Ekiv v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 (1892)]. But
see Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903). In Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strana-
han, 214 U. S. 320 (1909), a fine was administratively imposed and collected in this
manner. See also FpauND, op cit. supra note 11, §§ 250, 262.
18. Cf. N. Y. TAx LAw (1930) § 291 et seq. (review by certiorari on grounds of
illegality, error, and inequality, and new evidence taken in the discretion of the court);
see notes 14-16, supra. But customs and immigration proceedings are appealed to the
Court of Customs Appeals and the Secretary of Labor respectively, whose decisions are
final. 36 STAT. 105 (1909), 28 U. S. C. §§ 308-310 (1926); 39 STAT. 887 (1917), 8 U. S. C.
§§ 153-157 (1926).
19. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311 (1903); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 (1926). As to summary procedure allowed in collecting government funds from reve-
nue officers see Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272
(U. S. 1855).
20. Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684 (1896); Title Guaranty Co. v. Allen, 240 U. S.
136 (1916); Commonwealth v. Hargis Bank and Trust Co., 233 Ky. 801, 26 S. W. (2d)
1045 (1930).
21. Peoria Railroad Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 528 (1924); Avent v. United States,
266 U. S. 127 (1924).
22. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1894); North American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100 (1891).
Summary action is allowed in the other cases when the public health, safety or welfare are
endangered. Hall v. Gieger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917) (revocation of license to
sell stock under Blue Sky Law); People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health of New
York City, 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907) (revocation of license to sell milk without
hearing); Halsey, Stuart and Co. v. Public Service Commission, 248 N. W. 459 (Wis. 1933).
23. People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1, 35
N. E. 320 (1893).
24. American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908).
25. Cf. Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1896); Avent v. United States, 266
U. S. 127 (1924); Miller v. Stock, 65 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933) (order of the
The exceptional procedure provided by the Denison Act could not be upheld
on a similar ground of administrative necessity. It was not intended to meet
an essential governmental or public need for speedy administrative action, but
rather to help overcome the opposition which the railroads exhibited to the
Congressional policy of extending the benefits of water communcation to inland
communities and to eliminate the delays and expense of long hearings.2 6 Con-
sequently the validity of the procedure would be highly doubtful if the Com-
mission sought literally to enforce it.27 But consideration of this question is
rendered academic by the action of the Court in reading into this statute a
requirement that the Commission not only grant a subsequent hearing but also
defer putting its order into effect until after that hearing. As thus construed
the procedure will be of considerably less value to the Commission in carrying
out the Congressional policy, for the railroads are thus placed in a position
to obstruct and delay the proceedings. There remains, however, the pro-
vision shifting the burden of proof to the complainant at the subsequent hearing,
and until the weight of this burden is settled no sound conclusion as to the
value of the procedure can be reached. If it is given no more than the weight
of a prina facie presumption, the ex parte order will amount to no more than
a notice to show cause; but sufficient strength could be accorded to it so that
it would be unnecessary in every case for the Commission to introduce evidence
to support its order.28" The imposition of such a burden would discourage
parties from demanding a hearing and in the event of a hearing it would
save the Commission valuable time as well as help them support their order
in the courts. Thus something of the legislative purpose could still be realized.
The Court's approval of a procedure whereby an administrative hearing is
necessary only upon complaint is therefore not entirely without significance.
Any administrative body using such a procedure would profit insofar as it
was able to arrive at determinations which the parties were willing to accept.
In the face of the expense of a hearing and the possible expense of an appeal
to the courts, parties might well decide in all except the clearest cases to
acquiesce, particularly if they must carry any considerable burden of proof.
Perhaps in the "quasi-judicial" proceedings 29 of administrative bodies the
Comptroller may be set aside by the bank only on grounds of fraud, mistake, or clear
error of law).
26. See House Report No. 1537, House of Rep., 71st Cong., 1st Sess.
27. Commissioners Woodlock, Brainerd, and Farrell in Procedure Under Barge Line
Act, 148 1. C. C. 129 (1928), at 141, express doubt as to its constitutionality. Two
federal judges held it unconstitutional in Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. United States, 3 F.
Supp. 1005 (D. Del. 1933), the third dissenting on the ground that there was no depriva-
tion of property. The Commission and the government were sufficiently uncertain so
that they conceded in argument that a hearing was necessary. See note 9, supra. And
five members of the Supreme Court intimated their disapproval by seizing on this ad-
mission and limiting their decision to the validity of the procedure as so construed.
28. Upon review a court could look to the railroads' evidence to see if it proved beyond
a reasonable doubt the unreasonableness of the rates ordered instead of examining as
heretofore the Commission's evidence to see if there were sufficient to support the order.
29. See FREuND, op. cit. supra note 11, at 15, for analysis of the distinction between
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necessity for examining the facts of the particular cases will make prior hear-
ings essential. On the other hand in "quasi-legislative" proceedings, 30 where
experience, ability, and continuous first-hand knowledge of the subject matter
are relatively much more important, such a procedure in expert hands might
prove exceedingly valuable.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS OF BANK
RECEIVING DEPOSITS WHILE INSOLVENT
DURING the critical period of financial weakness just preceding the failure of
a bank, its officers and directors are in a precarious position. Whether the
bank's unsound condition is attributable to misfortune or to mismanagement,
the quandary is one requiring delicate judgment in the face of antagonistic
calls to duty. On the one hand liquidation may entail sacrifice of value and
costly delay to depositors; on the other, unsuccessful continuation of business
in the effort to improve the bank's condition may result in eventual failure
and even more substantial loss. Usually, however, self-interest and a respon-
sibility toward present depositors both urge the officers to continue operations.
To do this a semblance of normality must be maintained; the bank must con-
tinue to receive deposits from old and new customers and thereby jeopardize
their interests by accepting their money in return for a credit risk known to
be defective. Should it subsequently develop that the continuation of business
was unwise these latter depositors may well feel that their interests should have
been protected by refusal to accept their deposits, however drastic the con-
sequences to the bank. To the extent that this sentiment is reflected in the
law a difficult issue confronts the banker in attempting to determine how far he
may with impunity impair the interests of such new depositors in an effort
to rescue the institution.
At common law it was the rare exception that criminal liability was visited
upon officers and directors who received deposits knowing the bank to be
insolvent; the few courts that went to this extreme invoked the principles of
false pretenses.- True, under the same circumstances some jurisdictions per-
mitted the depositor to hold civilly responsible those officers and directors who
judicial and legislative powers. "The line between powers operative from case to case
and powers operative by way of general rule is of course a fluid one." See also DIc=nmsoN,
op. cit. supra, note 11, at 5-25. Most of the decisions of health boards, industrial accident
boards, zoning boards, patent and pension authorities, and of tax, custom and immigration
officials might properly be called quasi-judicial.
30. Public utility regulation and rate-making are ordinarily spoken of as legislative
functions. Cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line 211 U. S. 210, 227 (1908); Lake Erie and
Western Rr. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission, 249 U. S. 422 (1919).
1. Rex v. Carpenter, 22 Cox Crim. Cas. 618 (Eng. 1911); Commonwealth v. Schwartz,
92 Ky. 510, 18 S. W. 775 .(1892); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405, 6 AtI. 685
(1886). Contra: People v. Moore, 37 Hun 84 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885).
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were aware of the situation. 2  The courts which reached this conclusion did
so by assimilating the facts to the familiar category of fraud on the ground
that to maintain a bank open for business tacitly represented that it was
solvent.3 Thus in both civil and criminal cases the formal fact of insolvency
was said to be of primary importance in limiting the discretion of a bank's
managers to continue business. However, in the absence of statute, the more
widely accepted view imposed upon the directors no duty which ran to the
depositors. With the exception of active misrepresentation by means of which
the depositor was induced to deposit or to forbear making a withdrawal,
4
neither criminal nor civil liability was incurred 3
Apparently, however, the policy enunciated by the judiciary failed to reflect
public sentiment, for there has been no dearth of criminal statutes forbidding
banks to receive deposits after insolvency. The extent of legislative antipathy
toward what has been characterized as the "grossest kind of malfeasance and
deceit and a crime under the law" is indicated by the fact that with the
exception of nine jurisdictions7 on the Atlantic seaboard, every state8 has
2. Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N. E. 676 (1887), aff'g 17 Ill. App. 531 (1885);
Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 233, 7 S. W. 742 (1888). A conclusion upon the same basis was
reached in Cassidy v. Uhlman, 170 N. Y. 505, 63 N. E. 554 (1902), though a penal statute
was there in force; see id. 54 App. Div. 205, 66 N. Y. Supp. 670 (1st Dep't 1900).
3. It is frequently said that to maintain a bank open for business in usual course is a
representation of solvency. See Steele v. Commissioner of Banks, 240 Mass. 394, 397, N. E.
401, 402 (1922); Baker v. State, 54 Wis. 368, 377, 12 N. W. 12, 17 (1882).
4. Prescott v. Haughey, 65 Fed. 653 (C. C. Ind. 1895); Hinson v. Drummond, 98 Fla.
502, 123 So. 913 (1929); Blumer v. Ulmer, 44 So. 161 (Miss. 1907); Townsend v. Williams,
117 N. C. 330, 23 S. E. 461 (1895); Solomon v. Bates, 118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896);
cf. Olson v. Nelson, 177 Minn. 354, 225 N. W. 276 (1929).
5. Duffy v. Byrne, 7 Mo. App. 417 (1879) ; Hart v. Evanson, 14 N. D. 570, 105 N. W.
942 (1895); Minton v. Stahlman, 96 Tenn. 98, 34 S. W. 222 (1896). The conflict between
these cases and those cited in note 2 is but another manifestation of the broader conflict
as to the liability of directors for negligence and mismanagement. See 1 MicHz, BANIs
AND BAN=o (1931) §§ 130, 131; (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 277.
6. Ellett v. Newland, 171 La. 1019, 1023, 132 So. 761, 762 (1931).
7. The exceptions are: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont.
8. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 3403; Alaska Laws 1913, c. 48, § 22; ARIz. CODE
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4798; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 697; CAL.
PEI'. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 562; CoLo. Axi. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §§ 356, 381t; GA. PE.
CODE (Michie, 1926) § 211(29); IDAHO CODE ANN.. (1932) § 25-903; IL. REV. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 38, § 61; IND. AN_. STAT. (Bums, 1926) § 2479; IOWA CODE (1931)
§ 9279; KY,. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 9, § 119; M. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 11,
§ 58; MAss. GErs. LAws (1932) c. 266, § 54; MIcH. Coirr. LAws (1929) § 11933; Mich.
Pub. Acts 1931, No. 328, § 100; MT=. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10407; MIss. CODE ANN.
(1930) §§ 922, 3807; MONT. Rzv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) §§ 6014.70, 6014.87; NEB.
Comn'. STAT. (1929) § 8-147; N. M. STAT. Amx. (Courtright, 1929) § 13-601; N. Y. PEN.
LAW (1909) § 295; N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1931) § 224(g); N. D. Laws 1931, c. 96,
§ 47; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 710-714; ORIA. STAT. (1931) § 9188; ORE. CODE ANN.
(1930) § 22-1504; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, §§ 2401, 2485; S. C. CiUn. CODE
(1932) § 1351; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 8998; TENN. CODE (1932) § 6043; TEx. REv.
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enacted such a statute and three states9 have analogous provisions in their
constitutions. It is the preventive function of this legislation which predom-
inates. The universality of the criminal penalties emphasize that the rationale
is to protect the public against the insolvency of banks. In some vague, un-
analyzed manner it is thought that the depositors will be more secure, the
officers more diligent.' 0 In fact, two of the states expressly place upon the offi-
cers and directors the duty of examining the bank and knowing its condition."
Incidentally, the remedial aspect has not been overlooked. A considerable
number of the statutes expressly impose a civil liability as well,'12 and some
courts by judicial construction have superimposed the civil liability upon the
criminal penalty. 3 The recovery thus granted is the only one available where
a preference cannot be secured under the doctrine of tracing trust funds.
14
In dealing with the statutory crime thus created one or two courts, by strict
construction, have held that the defendant, to be convicted, must have per-
sonally received the deposit in question.15 Condemnations of such a con-
PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 557; UTAH Comp. LAws (1917) § 8369; VA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1930) § 4149(29); WASH. Com. STAT. (Remington, 1932) §§ 2640, 3288; W. VA.
CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 8, §§ 34, 39; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 348.19; WVYO. REv. STAT. ANN.
(1931) § 32-346. And see notes 12 and 38, infra.
9. Ky. CONST., § 204; Mo. CONST., art. 12, § 27; VAsr. CONST., art 12, § 12.
10. See e.g. State v. Buhler, 132 La. 1065, 1080, 62 So. 145, 151 (1913): "They (the
statutes) are made far-reaching because of the desire to sustain the regularity of bus-
iness . . . Financial regularity and stability are prominent traits of superior civilization
which the lawmaker has attempted to sustain by adopting strict laws applying to all those
in charge as officers of banking institutions.'
11. These states are Kansas and Nevada. See statutes cited in note 8, supra and note
12, infra. And failure to discharge such duty is, according to the statutes, sufficient of itself
to impute knowledge of insolvency to the defendant.
12. CoLo. ANN. STAT. '(Mills, 1930) § 356; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 9, § 163;
KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 597; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 672, 673; Mo. REy.
STAT. (1929) § 5381; Nev. Stat. 1933, c. 190 § 19; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §
13-142.
13. Ellett v. Newland, supra, note 6; Baxter v. Coughlin, 70 Minn. 1, 72 N. W. 797
(1897) (citing the "rule" that "where the statute prohibits the doing of an act, or imposes
a duty on one, for the benefit or protection of individuals, if he disobeys the prohibition
or neglects to perform the duty, he is liable to those for whose protection the statute was
enacted."); Hyland v. Roe, 111 Wis. 361, 87 N. W. 252 (1901); cf. Hughes v. Martin, 81
Okla. '89, 196 Pac. 951 (1921). Contra: Hart v. Evanson, supra note 5.
14. A preference is granted to the depositor who deposited funds while the bank was
insolvent, but only upon condition that a trust res is established by tracing the assets
into the hands of the receiver. See (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1150; (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 307.
But in a criminal prosecution against the officer or director it is no defense that the cus-
tomer could thus receive a preference. State v. Eifert, 102 Iowa 188, 65 N. W. 309 (1895),
71 N. W. 248 (1897). It has even been suggested that it would be no defense that through
fortunate liquidation every depositor was paid in full. Johnson v. Floan, 183 Minn. 461,
465, 237 N. W. 23, 25 (1931).
15. Ex Parte Rickey, 31 Nev. 82, 100 Pac. 134 (1909); State v. Lewis, 141 S. C. 207,
139 S. E. 386 (1927); ci. Ex parte Smith, 33 Nev. 466, 111 Pac. 930 (1910). But the
statutes of some states expressly apply to those officers who are "accessory to or permit or
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clusion as practically a nullification of the statute have not been lacking, and
in most jurisdictions the contention has not found a warm reception. 16 Further,
the crime is of such a nature that fraudulent intent is not essential; it is enough
that the defendant intended to receive the deposit regardless of his animus. 
7
Ordinarily, then, the elements of the crime are inertia and actual knowledge
of insolvency. However, the process has not stopped here. Some of the
statutes are satisfied if the defendant merely had "reason to believe" that
the bank was insolvent,' 8 a turn of expression by virtue of which negligence
would seem to approach criminality.19 In other jurisdictions a statutory pre-
sumption is set up implying the essential knowledge of insolvency from the
mere fact that the bank failed, 20 and the United States Supreme Court has had
occasion to hold this presumption not open to objection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 ' These would both seem to be indirect attempts to force atten-
tion to duty by in terrorem methods.
Of all the essentials of the crime which must be proved perhaps the most
troublesome is the insolvency of the institution at the time the deposit was
received. The insolvency charge must be proved in the criminal trial itself;
the record of a civil suit for the appointment of a receiver -2 2 or the list of assets
connive at the receiving or accepting" of deposits. See e.g. State v. Eifert, 102 Iowa 188,
65 N. W. 309 (1895), 71 N. W. 248 (1897).
16. Carr v. State, 104 Ala. 4, 16 So. 150 (1894); Hudson v. State, 37 Okla. Cr. 290, 258
Pac. 352 (1927); State v. Mitchell, 96 Miss. 259, 51 So. 4 (1910). In State v. Cramer, 20
Idaho 639, 654, 119 Pac. 30, 35, (1911) the court pointed out that to require manual re-
ception would give the officers "every opportunity for defrauding the public by receiving
deposits through dummy and temporary employees."
17. See e.g. Banks v. State, 185 Ark. 539, 546, 48 S. W. (2d) 847, 850 (1932): "In order
to find defendant guilty it was not necessary to impute to him any fraudulent intent in
the conduct of the affairs of the bank-it was only necessary to find that he had know-
ledge of its insolvency." However, the statutes of the following states require that for
conviction the defendant must have "fraudulently" received the deposit. Alaska, Indiana,
Iowa ("with intent to defraud"), Michigan, Washington, West Virginia. See statutes
supra, note 8. By amendment in 1911 Idaho eliminated the requirement of fraudulent
intent. Compare Idaho Laws 1911, c. 124, § 71 with Idaho Laws 1905, p. 175, § 19.
Iowa, on the other hand added it in 1929, and as to the effect of the change see State v.
Brown, 215 Iowa 600, 246 N. W. 258 (1933).
18. Alabama, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin. See
statutes cited in notes 8 and 12, supra.
19. And yet negligence alone is insufficient. Sturdivant v. State, 25 Ala. App. 148, 142
So. 116 (1932); Buckley v. State, 121 Miss. 66, 83 So. 403 (1920). Cf. as to civil liability
Goldsworthy v. Anderson, 92 Colo. 446, 21 P. (2d) 718 (1933); Daniels v. Berry, 148 S. C.
446, 146 S. E. 420 (1929).
20. Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, New Mexico, Texas. See statutes cited in notes 8 and
12, supra. But the jury is not compelled to draw the inference even in the absence of
rebuttal. State v. Shelby, 64 S. W. (2d) 269 (Mo. 1933).
21. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88 (1928). See also Robertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279,
38 Pac. 326 (1894); Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991 (1896); State v.
Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949 (1897).
22. Green v. State, 184 N. E. 183 (Ind. 1933).
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filed by a private banker in involuntary bankruptcy 23 are inadmissible against
him when he is being prosecuted. However, more is involved than a question
of witnesses and method of proof. The issue of when the bank is insolvent
within the meaning of the criminal statute is one for the jury, and it is here
that the outstanding conflict in the case occurs.24 A substantial number of the
courts approve as the instruction for the jury what is known as the "bankruptcy
rule" according to which the bank is insolvent when it is unable to pay its
obligations as they become due in the ordinary course of business.2 5  Accord-
ing to the "liberal" view, on the other hand, a bank is insolvent within the
meaning of the statute when its assets26 are less in value than the amount of
its debts, exclusive of its capital stock, surplus and undivided profits, allow-
ing a reasonable time for the conversion of the assets into money.27
It is obvious that in a close case conviction or acquittal might depend upon
which view is adopted. However, it is conceivable that the issue is only
academic for in practice a criminal suit is probably brought only when the
bank is found to have been hopelessly insolvent. The acceptance of the
stricter view obviously makes an easier case for the prosecution, for it is relatively
simple to prove that a bank was unable to meet its demands in the ordinary
course of business. And it has been said that a panic in banking circles is no
excuse. 28  If this inflexible attitude is taken, the adoption of this rule might
23. State v. Drew, 110 Minn. 247, 124 N. W. 1091 (1910). To hold otherwise, said
the court, would be a violation of the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. But cf. State v. Strait, 94 Minn.
384, 102 N. W. 913 (1905). The Virginia statute, supra note 8, makes it the duty of any
banker indicted pursuant to its provisions to produce on demand all his books and papers
to be read as evidence. The only reported case in this jurisdiction, Boyenton v. Common-
wealth, 114 Va. 841, 76 S. E. 945 (1913), came up on demurrer to the indictment, and the
statutory requirement was not challenged.
24. Insolvency is defined by statute in some states. E.g. Nan. Comps. STAT. (1929) §
8-116. And see State v. Ohlfest, 30 P. (2d) 301 (Kan. 1934) (failure to make good reserve
as required by law); State v. Rodman, 57 N. D. 230, 221 N. W. 25 (1928); State v. Syver-
son, 39 S. D. 638, 166 N. W. 157 (1918). But cf. White v. State, 36 Okla. Crim. 57, 252
Pac. 455 (1927) (statutory definition held inapplicable in criminal prosecution).
25. Banks v. State, 185 Ark. 539, 48 S. W. (2d) 847 (1932) ; State v. Carter, 182 Iowa
905, 164 N. W. 759 (1917) ; State v. Meyers, 54 Kan. 206, 38 Pac. 296 (1894) ; State v. Lewis,
323 Mo. 1070, 20 S. W. (2d) 529 (1929); State v. Stevens, 16 S. D. 309, 92 N. W. 420
(1902).
26. The liability of stockholders under the double-liability clause is not to be considered
an asset. Collman v. State, 161 Ark. 351, 236 S. W. 359 (1923); White v. State, 42 Okla.
Cr. 50, 275 Pac. 1067 (1929).
27. People v. Clark, 229 Ill. 104, 160 N. E. 233 (1928); Smith v. State, 203 Ind. 561, 181
N. E. 519 (1932); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 136 Ky. 77, 123 S. W. 339 (1909); State v.
Clements, 82 Minn. 434, 85 N. W. 234 (1901) ; State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121 S. E.
616 (1924); Appelget v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 125, 243 Pac. 251 (1926); Gass v. State,
130 Tenn. 581, 172 S. W. 305 (1914) ; Brown v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. 353, 162 S. W. 339 (1913);
Ellis v. State, 138 Wis. 513, 119 N. W. 1110 (1909).
28. See State v. Burlingame, 146 Mo. 207, 227, 48 S. W. 72, 77 (1898); State v. Darrah,
152 Mo. 522, 539, 54 S. W. 226, 232 (1899). But cf. Ferry v. Bank of Central New York,
15 How Pr. 445 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1858).
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work serious injustice during periods of widespread bank failures. Even the
rule characterized as "liberal" would be unduly stringent where the assets
have been liquidated in a demoralized securities market.2 9 A liquidation of
almost any bank under such circumstances would result in the conclusion that
the bank was insolvent. There is thus presented the possibility of an officer's
being branded as a felon because of circumstances largely beyond his control; 30
here at least the concession of extending the "reasonable" time for liquidation
should be granted to the defendant in the event that the "liberal" view is
adopted.3 '
The cumulative effect of these factors is that under certain circumstances
criminal responsibility may be imposed upon extremely tenuous grounds. As
might well be expected, the constitutionality of the statutes themselves has
been challenged. But whatever the attack, whether under the due process
clause32 or the equal protection clause3 3 of the Federal Constitution, or under
the state's inhibition against imprisonment for debt,34 they have in every in-
stance been sustained as constitutional. The only restriction imposed upon their
scope by judicial construction is that they have been held inapplicable to
national banks.
3G
In spite of the fact that these statutes have existed for more than fifty
years,30 there could be no more appropriate time than the present for an apprais-
29. The state, of course, must prove that the bank was insolvent on the day the deposit
was received. But the actual sale price of the assets is admissible circumstantial evidence.
State v. Hoffman, 120 La. 949, 45 So. 951 (1908).
30. Judicial recognition of the harshness of the statutes in individual cases is frequent.
See e.g. State v. Ohlfest, 30 P. (2d) 301 (Kan. 1934) ; State v. Buhler, 132 La. 1065, 62 So.
145 (1913). The defendant is not liable criminally, however, if the deposit was received
in violation of his orders. Commonwealth v. Junkin, 170 Pa. 194, 32 AtI. 617 (1895).
31. In Schroeder v. State, 210 Wis. 366, 244 N W. 599 (1932), cert. den., 289 U. S. 757
(1933), it was suggested that a "reasonable" time for the liquidation of bonds held in June,
1931, was three years. And in Brenan v. Eubank, 56 S. W. (2d) 513, 515 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) (civil case) the court took judicial notice of the fact that the present economic de-
pression had caused the failure of many heretofore flourishing banks.
32. Dreyer v. Pease, 88 Fed. 978 (C. C. Ill. 1898), aff'd, 176 U. S. 681 (1900); Meadow-
croft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 991 (1896); State v. Bevins, 210 Iowa 1031, 230 N. W.
865 (1930), appeal dismissed, 282 U. S. 815 (1931).
33. Robertson v. People, supra, note 21; State v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 522, 54 S. W. 226
(1889); Ex parte Pittman, 31 Nev. 43, 99 Pac. 700 (1909); State v. Willis, 130 Tenn. 403,
170 S. W. 1030 (1914); Baker v. State, 54 Wis. 368, 12 N. W. 17 (1882).
34. Youmans v. State, 7 Ga. App. 101, 66 S. E. 383 (1909); Commonwealth v. Sponsler,
16 Pa. Co. Ct. 116 (1895); State v. Willis, 130 Tenn. 403, 170 S. W. 1030 (1914). Nor
is the statute void as contrary to the constitutional provision against cruel and unusual
punishments. Colhman v. State, 161 Ark. 351, 256 S. W. 357 (1923).
35. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220 (1903). The same statute, in spite of this holding,
applies with full vigor to officers of state banks. State v. Bevins, 210 Iowa 1031, 230 N. W.
865 (1930), appeal dismissed, 282 U. S. 815 (1931).
36. It was not until 1880 that this type of statute became general, though the earliest
was passed in Pennsylvania in 1863. See PA. STAT. AxNm. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, § 2401.'
However, in 1829 New York had enacted a statute punishing directors of moneyed cor-
1934] COMMENTS
al of their efficacy. The protection of the depositor from irresponsible and in-
competent management is at best a difficult problem but it is to be doubted
whether criminal penalties of this nature can accomplish much. Imposition of
criminal punishment without a showing of felonious intent is a reflection upon
the banking system of the United States. One can but suspect that criminal
prosecutions under these statutes are extremely rare in comparison with the
number of officers who come within their purview. If the reported cases are
any criterion, there are at least ten states which have never made any attempt
to enforce them,3 7 although only one of these statutes has ever been repealed.38
Significance may be found in the fact that the repeal took place in 1931 and
in the state which had been strictest and most diligent in its enforcement.
Aside from the possibility that in individual cases there may be hardship
and that in some states the law has fallen into complete disuse, there have been
criticisms upon more fundamental grounds. The United States Supreme Court
in denying their applicability to national banks quite clearly demonstrated its
disapproval. "There may be good reason to believe," said Mr. Justice Shiras,
"that, though temporarily embarrassed, the bank's affairs may take a fortunate
turn. Some of the assets that cannot at once be converted into money may be of
a character to justify the expectation that, if actual and open insolvency may
be avoided, they may ultimately be collectible and thus the ruin of the bank
and its creditors be prevented ... But under the state statute no such conserv-
ative action can be followed by the officers of the bank except at the risk of
the penalties of fine and imprisonment."3 9 Literally followed the statutes would
impose upon the officers and directors the duty of closing a bank immediately
upon discovering that the bank is insolvent. And yet there may well be cir-
cumstances when the interests of the bank would better be served by entering
into negotiations with a view to averting the disaster.40  To refuse at that time
to receive deposits is, of course, tantamount to closing the bank.41 Viewed in
porations for "fraudulent insolvency." See People v. Mancuso, 255 N. Y. 463, 175 N. E.
177 (1931); (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 994.
37. Alaska, California, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Utah, West Vir-
ginia, Wyoming.
38. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 4116 was repealed by Mo. Laws 1931, p. 201, § 1. There
remains, of course, the similar provision in the state constitution, supra, note 9; but it
is inoperative to impose criminal liability without supplementary legislation. State v.
Sattley, 131 Mo. 464, 33 S. W. 41 (1895). As for civil liability, the same conclusion was
reached in Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256 (1878); but a dictum expressing a personal
doubt in Cummings v. Winn, 89 Mo. 51, 56, 14 S. W. 512, 513 (1886) has apparently
been accepted as an overruling decision. See Ivie v. Bailey, 319 Mo. 474, 484, 5 S. W. (2d)
50, 53 (1928); cf. Mallon v. Hyde, 76 Fed. 388 (C. C. Wash. 1896) (Washington consti-
tution held self-executing as to civil liability). In any event civil liability is still imposed
by § 5381.
39. See Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 235 (1903).
40. See Illinois Central Railroad v. Rawlings, 66 F. (2d) 146, 150 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933);
Harriet State Bank v. Samels, 164 Minn. 265, 272, 204 N. W. 938, 941 (1925) ("It would
be an unwarranted construction of the statute to hold that it makes acts criminal which
were clearly done for the laudable purpose of maintaining the solvency of the bank.")
41. Sanction has been given to one device for avoiding liability and at the same time
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this light the statutes set a standard that is arbitrary since the formal fact of
insolvency does not necessarily indicate that a bank may not reasonably be
expected to recuperate. Under such an arbitrary standard no reasonable dis-
cretion can be exercised by the officers and directors for the welfare of the in-
stitution except at the hazard of personal security. The analysis of the Supreme
Court thus points out a genuine weakness.
This does not mean, however, that the statutes serve no useful function. The
safeguards erected by the common law were scarcely sufficiently robust to cope
with the insolvent banker who deliberately intended to defraud the depositors.
A statute aimed only at this evil could have been easily drafted and readily en-
forced. But by the inflicting of a penalty for receiving a deposit after know-
ledge of insolvency, or after presumptive knowledge of insolvency, a fact
difficult of ascertainment in any event, the legislators were seeking obliquely to
stimulate diligence. Unfortunately the result has been that many of the states
find themselves saddled with rules which must either be permitted to atrophy
or be enforced in times of economic depression only at the risk of unjust hard-
ship in many cases. Under the existing state of the law the tests of insolvency
and knowledge thereof are so nebulous that an honest judgment may be tainted
with criminality by ex post facto evidence. The proper function of such statutes
would be realized if criminal punishments were inflicted only when the defend-
ant permitted deposits to be received after there was no longer any reasonable
ground for expectation of repayment in ordinary course. Thus diligence
would be stimulated and the issue before a court would be more intimately
connected with the problem faced by the officers who decide whether or not a
bank should continue to do business. This was the position taken by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland when it was recently called upon for the first time to
construe its statute.42 In effect this entailed a redefinition of insolvency upon a
subjective, rather than an objective basis; the court viewed its construction
as the only one logically possible. And whatever may be said about the court's
abrupt departure from precedent, such an approach obviates the objection
raised by the Supreme Court, yet affords a check upon actual fraud and at the
same time protects the conscientious banker who in good faith seeks to protect
the interests of his bank.
keeping the bank open, namely that of keeping deposits separate from general funds and
returning them to depositors in the event of failure. State v. Miller, 131 Kan. 36, 289
Pac. 483 (1930); State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 N. W. 913 (1905); Sively v. State, 107
Miss. 118, 65 So. 118 (1914); Commonwealth v. Junkin, 107 Pa. 32 Atl. 617 (1895);
cf. Miller v. Howard, 95 Tenn. 407, 32 S. W. 305 (1895); MoNT. Rav. Cone (Choate,
Supp. 1927) § 6014.70.
42. Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45 (1933). The court suggested that an
important factor in the formation of a reasonable judgment by the accused was the fact
that the night before the bank closed, a meeting of bankers was called in an attempt to
rescue the institution. Legislative action might, however, be a better way to attain this
result. See Ark. Acts 1933, act 60, § 8.
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